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PREFACE 
 
The world generally is witnessing important and epoch-making changes. 
The United Nations is increasingly intensifying its efforts to promote and 
protect human rights. The regional organizations and institutions enhance 
their work in the same field and the awareness of individuals groups of 
their rights is increasing continuously. What we are witnessing today, in 
short, is an international human rights revolution. These efforts need to be 
supported by sophisticated researches on human rights. 
 
This research is intended to play some role in the anticipated human 
rights revolution at the national level. It basically concentrates on 
mechanisms for human rights protection, which is of a vital importance. 
It derives its importance not only from the importance of human rights 
but also from the fact that protection of human rights obviates armed 
conflicts and political instability. The main reason behind political 
instability in many third world countries is the gross human rights 
violations. The protection of human rights is also significant because it 
creates more opportunities for unity in a diverse country like Sudan. The 
strongest bonds of unification. The culture, language or religion for 
example cannot unite us. What unites us perhaps more than any thing else 
is our belief in human rights. 
 
This research shows how human rights can be promoted and protected in 
Sudan through national human rights institutions and domestic courts and 
explains the contributions that they can make to human rights conditions 
in this country. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
The modern human rights were born after the World War II when crimes 
were committed against humanity with the authorization of law. But the 
roots of these rights can be traced back to the days of Greeks and 
Romans. The American and French revolutions played an important role 
in the final formulation of these rights. 
 
The states of the world do not need to clarify the idea of human rights or 
to emphasize their significance in the political, economic and social 
development of the nation, but to illustrate the mechanisms that could be 
adopted in the promotion and protection of human rights process. 
 
This research tries to explain the role that such mechanisms can play in 
promoting and protecting of human rights. Chapter One discusses the 
historical roots of human rights by shading light on the concept of right 
generally and the concept of human rights in the positive law school, 
natural law school and modern school of human rights  in particular. In 
addition, it criticizes the objections raised against human rights idea. 
 
Chapter Two clarifies the types of human rights. It concentrates on civil 
and political rights which are necessary for establishing a democratic 
society and economic, social and cultural rights upon which any 
economic or cultural advancement depends. 
 
Chapter Three explains the role of national courts in protecting human 
rights mainly by the power of judicial review. It also states the remedies 
that the courts can grant to victims of human rights violations and 
includes some suggestions for developing new and more effective 
remedies for socio-economic rights. 
 
Chapter Four concentrates on national human rights institutions; namely 
national human rights commissions and ombudspersons as a modern 
mechanism for human rights protection. It analyses and evaluates the 
National Human Rights Commission Act 2004 and compares it to the 
experiences of some countries, particularly Uganda and South Africa. 
 
The final chapter (Chapter Five) concludes the research. It summarizes 
the important findings of the research. It also offers some 
recommendations which can contribute to human rights movement in this 
country and in any other country which is politically and economically 
similar to it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ﺍﻟﺨﻼﺼــﺔ
 
ﻥ ﺃﻥ ﻓﻜﺭﺓ ﺤﻘﻭﻕ ﺍﻹﻨﺴﺎﻥ ﺘﺭﺠﻊ ﺠﺫﻭﺭﻫﺎ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻋﻬﺩ ﺍﻟﺭﻭﻤـﺎﻥ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺭﻏﻡ ﻤ 
ﻭﺍﻹﻏﺭﻴﻕ ﺇﻻ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﻨﻅﺭﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﺤﺩﻴﺜﺔ ﻟﺤﻘﻭﻕ ﺍﻹﻨﺴﺎﻥ ﻫﻲ ﻭﻟﻴﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﻤﺂﺴﻲ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﺸـﻬﺩﺘﻬﺎ 
ﺍﻹﻨﺴﺎﻨﻴﺔ ﺇﺒﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﺤﺭﺏ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻟﻤﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﺜﺎﻨﻴﺔ ﺤﻴﺙ ﻜﺎﻨﺕ ﺍﻟﺩﻭل ﺘﺭﺘﻜﺏ ﺠﺭﺍﺌﻡ ﻀﺩ ﺍﻹﻨﺴﺎﻨﻴﺔ 
ﺍﻟﻔﺭﻨـﺴﻴﺔ ﻭﺍﻷﻤﺭﻴﻜﻴـﺔ ﻭﻗﺩ ﻟﻌﺒﺕ ﺍﻟﺜﻭﺭﺘﺎﻥ . ﻭﺒﺘﺨﻭﻴل ﻤﻥ ﻗﻭﺍﻨﻴﻥ ﻜﺘﺒﺘﻬﺎ ﻫﻲ ﺒﻴﺩﻫﺎ 
ﺩﻭﺭﺍﹰ ﻫﺎﻤﺎﹰ ﻭﺭﺌﻴﺴﺎﹰ ﻓﻲ ﺼﻴﺎﻏﺔ ﺤﻘﻭﻕ ﺍﻹﻨﺴﺎﻥ ﺒﺼﻭﺭﺘﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﻨﻬﺎﺌﻴﺔ ﻜﻤﺎ ﻫﻲ ﻤﻁﺭﻭﺤﺔ 
  . ﺍﻟﻴﻭﻡ
ﺃﻥ ﺩﻭل ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻟﻡ ﺍﻟﻴﻭﻡ ﻟﻴﺴﺕ ﺒﺤﺎﺠﺔ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺘﻭﻀﻴﺢ ﺃﻭ ﺘﺄﻜﻴﺩ ﺃﻫﻤﻴﺔ ﺤﻘﻭﻕ ﺍﻹﻨﺴﺎﻥ 
ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻨﻬﻀﺔ ﺍﻟﺴﻴﺎﺴﻴﺔ ﻭﺍﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩﻴﺔ ﻭﺍﻻﺠﺘﻤﺎﻋﻴﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺜﻘﺎﻓﻴﺔ ﻷﻱ ﻤﺠﺘﻤﻊ ﻴﺘﻁﻠـﻊ ﺇﻟـﻰ 
ﻫﻲ ﺒﺤﺎﺠﺔ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺒﻴﺎﻥ ﺍﻵﻟﻴﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﻴﻤﻜﻥ ﺃﻥ ﺘﺴﺎﻋﺩ ﻓﻲ ﻋﻤﻠﻴـﺔ ﺘﻌﺯﻴـﺯ ﺍﻟﺘﻘﺩﻡ ﻭﺇﻨﻤﺎ 
  . ﻭﺤﻤﺎﻴﺔ ﺤﻘﻭﻕ ﺍﻹﻨﺴﺎﻥ
ﺃﻥ ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﺒﺤﺙ ﻴﺤﺎﻭل ﺘﻭﻀﻴﺢ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﺭ ﺍﻟﺫﻱ ﺒﻤﻘﺩﻭﺭ ﺒﻌـﺽ ﺍﻟﻤﺅﺴـﺴﺎﺕ ﺃﻥ 
ﺘﻠﻌﺒﻪ ﻓﻲ ﺘﻌﺯﻴﺯ ﻭﺤﻤﺎﻴﺔ ﺤﻘﻭﻕ ﺍﻹﻨﺴﺎﻥ ﻭﻫﻭ ﻤﻘﺴﻡ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻓﺼﻭل ﺨﻤﺴﺔ ﺘﻨﺎﻭل ﺍﻷﻭل 
ﻴﻁ ﺍﻟﻀﻴﺎﺀ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻤﻔﻬـﻭﻡ ﺍﻟﺤـﻕ ﻤﻨﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﺠﺫﻭﺭ ﺍﻟﺘﺎﺭﻴﺨﻴﺔ ﻟﺤﻘﻭﻕ ﺍﻹﻨﺴﺎﻥ ﻭﺫﻟﻙ ﺒﺘﺴﻠ 
ﺒﻭﺠﻪ ﻋﺎﻡ ﻭﻤﻔﻬﻭﻡ ﺤﻘﻭﻕ ﺍﻹﻨﺴﺎﻥ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻤﺩﺭﺴﺔ ﺍﻟﻭﻀﻌﻴﺔ ﻭﻤﺩﺭﺴﺔ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻨﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﻁﺒﻴﻌﻲ 
ﻭﺍﻟﻤﺩﺭﺴﺔ ﺍﻟﺤﺩﻴﺜﺔ ﻟﺤﻘﻭﻕ ﺍﻹﻨﺴﺎﻥ ﺒﻭﺠﻪ ﺨﺎﺹ، ﻜﻤﺎ ﻴﺴﺘﻌﺭﺽ ﺒﺎﻟﻨﻘﺩ ﺍﻻﻋﺘﺭﺍﻀﺎﺕ 
  . ﻭﺍﻟﻤﺨﺎﻭﻑ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﻴﺒﺩﻴﻬﺎ ﺒﻌﺽ ﺍﻟﺭﺍﻓﻀﻴﻥ ﻟﻔﻜﺭﺓ ﺤﻘﻭﻕ ﺍﻹﻨﺴﺎﻥ
ﻤﺘﻌﺩﺩﺓ ﻭﺍﻟﻤﺘﺒﺎﻴﻨﺔ ﻟﺤﻘـﻭﻕ ﺍﻹﻨـﺴﺎﻥ ﺃﻤﺎ ﺍﻟﻔﺼل ﺍﻟﺜﺎﻨﻲ ﻓﻴﻭﻀﺢ ﺍﻟﺘﺼﻨﻴﻔﺎﺕ ﺍﻟ 
ﻭﻴﺭﻜﺯ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺤﻘﻭﻕ ﺍﻟﻤﺩﻨﻴﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺴﻴﺎﺴﻴﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺤﻘﻭﻕ ﺍﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩﻴﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺜﻘﺎﻓﻴﺔ ﻭﺍﻻﺠﺘﻤﺎﻋﻴـﺔ 
. ﺤﻴﺙ ﺘﻠﻌﺏ ﺍﻟﺤﻘﻭﻕ ﺍﻟﻤﺩﻨﻴﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺴﻴﺎﺴﻴﺔ ﺩﻭﺭﺍﹰ ﻜﺒﻴﺭﺍﹰ ﻓﻲ ﺒﻨﺎﺀ ﺍﻟﻤﺠﺘﻤﻊ ﺍﻟـﺩﻴﻤﻘﺭﺍﻁﻲ 
ﻀﺔ ﺒﻴﻨﻤﺎ ﺘﻨﺒﻊ ﻀﺭﻭﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﺤﻘﻭﻕ ﺍﻻﺠﺘﻤﺎﻋﻴﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺜﻘﺎﻓﻴﺔ ﻭﺍﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩﻴﺔ ﻤﻥ ﺃﻨﻬﺎ ﺸﺭﻁ ﺍﻟﻨﻬ 
  . ﺍﻟﺜﻘﺎﻓﻴﺔ ﻭﺍﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩﻴﺔ ﻷﻓﺭﺍﺩ ﺍﻟﻤﺠﺘﻤﻊ
ﺃﻤﺎ ﺍﻟﻔﺼل ﺍﻟﺜﺎﻟﺙ ﻓﻘﺩ ﺘﻨﺎﻭل ﺩﻭﺭ ﺍﻟﻤﺤﺎﻜﻡ ﺍﻟﻭﻁﻨﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺤﻤﺎﻴﺔ ﺤﻘﻭﻕ ﺍﻹﻨﺴﺎﻥ، 
ﺨﺎﺼﺔ ﺒﻤﻤﺎﺭﺴﺘﻬﺎ ﻷﻫﻡ ﺴﻠﻁﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻴﺩﻫﺎ ﺇﻻ ﻭﻫﻲ ﺴﻠﻁﺔ ﺍﻟﺭﻗﺎﺒـﺔ ﻋﻠـﻰ ﺩﺴـﺘﻭﺭﻴﺔ 
ﻜﻤﺎ ﺃﻥ ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﻔﺼل ﻴﺘﻨﺎﻭل ﺍﻟﺠﺯﺍﺀﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﺎﺤﺔ ﺃﻤﺎﻡ ﺍﻟﻤﺤﺎﻜﻡ ﺍﻟﻭﻁﻨﻴﺔ ﻟﻜـل . ﺍﻟﻘﻭﺍﻨﻴﻥ
ﻭﻗﻊ ﻀﺤﻴﺔ ﺍﻨﺘﻬﺎﻜﺎﺕ ﺤﻘﻭﻕ ﺍﻻﻨﺴﺎﻥ، ﻭﻴﺘﻀﻤﻥ ﺍﻗﺘﺭﺍﺤﺎﹰ ﺒﺎﺒﺘﺩﺍﻉ ﺠﺯﺍﺀﺍﺕ ﻓﺎﻋﻠﺔ ﻤﻥ 
  . ﺨﺎﺼﺔ ﺒﺎﻟﺤﻘﻭﻕ ﺍﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩﻴﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺜﻘﺎﻓﻴﺔ ﻭﺍﻻﺠﺘﻤﺎﻋﻴﺔ
ﺃﻤﺎ ﺍﻟﻔﺼل ﺍﻟﺭﺍﺒﻊ ﻤﻥ ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﺒﺤﺙ ﻓﻴﺭﻜﺯ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻤﺅﺴﺴﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻭﻁﻨﻴﺔ ﻭﺘﺤﺩﻴـﺩﺍﹰ 
 ﻭﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﺘﻌﺘﺒـﺭ ﻭ ﺍﻤﻨﺎﺀ ﺍﻭ ﻫﻴﺌﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﻅﺎﻟﻡ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻤﻔﻭﻀﻴﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻭﻁﻨﻴﺔ ﻟﺤﻘﻭﻕ ﺍﻹﻨﺴﺎﻥ 
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Chapter One 
The Historical Roots of Human Rights 
 
1- Introduction. 
 
This chapter in general examines the concept of a right and human rights, 
the theoretical bases of human rights conjunctively with their history, 
objections of the idea of human rights, the main characteristics of the 
modern human rights, and finally it discusses the concept of human rights 
in Christianity and Islamic jurisprudence. 
 
2- The Concept of a Right. 
 
 It is important first of all to discuss and analyze the concept of a right. 
The word right means “entitlement”. To say that you have a right to 
something is to say that you are entitled to it: for instance, to vote, to 
receive an old-age pension, to hold your own opinion and to enjoy 
domestic privacy. Entitlement to something means that either the person 
who is entitled or someone else on his behalf must be able to answer the 
question, what entitles you to it? This presupposes that there are ways of 
becoming entitled to things and three ways immediately come to mind: 
law, custom and morality1. 
       
If someone is entitled to something, for him to be denied it by the action 
or the failure to act of someone else is wrong. It is also wrong for other 
people to penalize him or to make him suffer for having it. This follows 
from the meaning of 'entitlement'. If it is not wrong for other people to 
                                                 
1 . Milne, Human Rights and Human Diversity.89,(1999). 
 
deny you something, then it can not be something to which you are 
entitled. It is therefore appropriate for 'entitlements' to be called rights. If 
you are entitled to something it is right for you to have it. The role of 
other people is crucial in having a right. No wrong is done to you if you 
are denied what you are entitled to not by the action or failure to act of 
other people but by a natural event. If illness keeps you from a meeting 
which you are entitled to attend, that is unfortunate, but no one is to 
blame. Not so if someone forcibly prevents you from attending. He is 
violating one of your rights and thereby doing wrong to you.  No one can 
have a right to have fine weather on holiday, or to have a talented son. 
These are cases of good fortune, not of entitlement.2 
 
(i) Rights of Action and Rights of Recipience. 
 
 A Distinction is drawn between two types of rights; rights of action and 
rights of recipience. To have a right of action is to be entitled to do 
something or to act in a certain way. To have a right of recipience is to be 
entitled to receive something, or to be treated in a certain way. 
 
A right of recipience is violated when someone from whom you are 
entitled to receive something refuses to provide it, or when someone fails 
to accord you the treatment to which you are entitled, for instance, if you 
are refused your old-age pension, or treated with discourtesy. There is 
also a violation if you are to suffer for demanding what you are entitled to 
receive, or abused and threatened for protesting against being denied the 
treatment to which you are entitled. A right of action is violated when 
someone stops you doing what you are entitled to do, or threatens you 
                                                 
2 . There cannot be a right if it is not possible to say what action or failure to act would constitute a 
violation. 
with dire consequences if you do it, for instance, if someone forcibly 
prevents you from voting, or tries to intimidate you into remaining silent 
when you are entitled to speak.3 
 
  (ii)  Rights and correlative obligations. 
 
Every one is under a general obligation to refrain from doing anything 
which would violate any one else's rights. It follows that at least one 
obligation is correlative to every right. This is an obligation on every one. 
It is the only obligation which is necessarily correlative to every right of 
action. The same obligation is correlative to rights of recipience. 
 
It is, however, also wrong for anyone to do anything which prevents 
anyone else from meeting an obligation or which impedes or interferes 
with his meeting it. Equally, it is wrong for any one to be penalized or 
made to suffer for meeting an obligation. It is right for people to meet 
their obligations. The difference between peoples' right to have what they 
are entitled to and to meet their obligation is that when you are under an 
obligation you must meet it unless a more pressing obligation supervenes, 
in which case you must meet the latter. Subject to this qualification, you 
do not have choice about whether or not to meet an obligation. Not so in 
the case of a right. When you have a right, you are not obliged to exercise 
it, that is to say, you have a choice. 
 
To say that there is no choice about whether or not to meet an obligation 
is not to deny that it is physically possible not to meet it. In most 
countries the law imposes an obligation upon car-owners to insure their 
cars. It is possible for a man to drive his car without insuring it, but if he 
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does so he does wrong. The obligations legally exclude choice but can 
not physically exclude it. No human law can do that. By the same token, 
if I have made a promise, I am under a moral obligation to keep it. It is 
physically possible for me to break it but that would be wrong.4 
 
To say that to have a right is to have choice is straightforward in the case 
of rights of action, it is also true of most rights of recipience. If I have 
made a promise, not only am I under an obligation to keep it. But you 
have to demand that I should, but your right entitles you, if you choose, to 
release me from my obligation. It does not oblige you to insist that I do 
what I promise. 
 
But this is not in all cases. The right of children to be looked after by their 
parents is a right of recipience from which choice is normatively 
excluded. Children are not entitled to decline parental care and protection. 
Even if they do not want it, they must put up with it. They have no 
choice, morally or legally, about accepting the parental care, or the 
arrangements made for them. They must be looked after either by their 
parents, or other competent adults. This means that, strictly speaking, 
children do not have a right to be looked after, they have an obligation to 
submit to it. But this is at the variance with ordinary language. We do not 
say the children have an obligation to accept parental care and protection, 
but that they are entitled, that is, they have a right to it.5 
 
 (iii) Elective Rights and Non- elective rights. 
 
                                                 
4 . Choice is normatively excluded in the sense that a right action is one which must done and a wrong 
one which must not be done. 
5 . Milne, supra note 1 at 92 
Rights are also divided into elective and non- elective. Elective rights 
normally confer choice. Every right of action is an elective right, because 
the right-holder is entitled not only to do but also to refrain from doing 
what he has a right to do. The same holds for every right of recipience 
which entitles the right-holder not only to receive but also to decline what 
he has a right to receive, or to acquiesce in not receiving it without 
protest. Non-elective rights normatively exclude choice. They are those 
rights of recipience which entitle the right-holder to receive something 
but do not entitle him to decline it. There is however, a difference 
between non-elective rights and obligations. Non-elective rights are 
essentially passive in character. There is nothing which the right-holder is 
required to do. He is simply the beneficiary of certain treatment which 
others are under an obligation to accord him.6 
                                        
(iv) The Concept of Human Rights. 
 
The very term "Human Rights" is problematic. It straddles several 
universes of discourse. Moral philosophers signify by it a set of ethical 
imperatives that contribute to making the basic structure of society and 
state to be and remain overall 'just'. International lawyers regard the term 
as a set of norms and standards produced juridically (as having some sort 
of binding effect on the behavior of state and regional and international 
organizations). Architects and administrators of regional governance 
(such as the European or African Unions) regard 'Human Rights' 
promotion and protection as symbolic of the syndrome of shared 
sovereignty. For national power-elites, 'Human Rights' provide 
vocabularies of legitimation of governance. For those who regard 
practices and structures of governance as deeply unjust or morally flawed, 
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'Human Rights' represent a cry against oppression. These different 
viewpoints of people in different fields of our modern life make it 
necessary to discuss human rights concept from a pure academic point of 
view. To do this let us state the theoretical bases of human rights. 
 
 3- Theoretical bases of Human Rights. 
 
There are three prominent bases for justifying human rights. The idea of 
positive law, the idea of natural law, and the recent times idea which 
bases human rights on human dignity. I will discuss them in turn. 
  
(i)  Positive Law Rights. 
 
The tribal societies that conquered Rome were in no sense democracies, 
but their kings were generally, at least in principle, elected to that status 
usually from the members of particular family deemed to be of quasi-
divine origin and they ruled with the rough and ready consent of their 
(male) subjects. Things could hardly be otherwise in a context that ‘the 
people’ were, in effect, a war-band. Briefly stated, during the middle ages 
these consensual elements of ruled were, in some places, combined with 
the legal notion, central to Roman law of a 'contract' , with the result that 
political authority came to be understood as based on , and limited by , a 
bargain struck between the rulers and the ruled .For the English speaking 
world the most important such bargain is the 'Great Charter' (Magna 
Carta) agreed between king John and the barons in 1215, but European 
history provides a number of similar examples of systems of rights and 
duties being established by the political equivalent of a contract between 
the rulers and those amongst the ruled in possession of real bargaining 
power.7 
  
An Analysis of these 'charter rights' leads us to say that they have a 
number of features which we can note as follows: First like any other 
rights they come out of a contract. They involve reciprocity rights that are 
always accompanied by correlative duties: Secondly they are usually 
quite specific; for example much of Magna Carta is taken up with details 
about subject such as wardship, or the taking of woods by royal officials: 
Thirdly the parties who hold rights and owe duties are specified. 
 
These features are carried forward into the theory and practice of rights in 
modern times. Theories of political obligation based on a notional ' Social 
contract ' work in much the same way, and the 'positive law' of rights 
established by modern western liberal democracies shares the same 
features. Indeed some analysts argue that these features are essential to 
the very notion of a right; the only true rights are specific and correlative 
“claim rights”.8 
 
It is clear that if this is so, there cannot be genuine 'human rights, ' that is 
to say, rights that adhere to an individual simply on the basis of his or her 
humanity. If the only real rights are those created as part of a legal system 
by an explicit contract between the rulers and the ruled, then those who 
are not parties to such a contract cannot be rights bearers, or bound by 
reciprocal duties. 
 
                                                 
7 . Chris Brown, Universal Human Rights. An Analysis of the ‘Human-Rights Culture’ and its Critics, 
in G. Patman (ed.), Universal Human Rights.36 (2003). 
8 . Id, at 37. 
The idea of deriving rights from a social contract was revived by Rawls 
who suggested that if hypothetical individuals were devising a structure 
for future society where they were ignorant of what sort of individuals 
they were or what positions in society they would occupy, those 
individuals would agree that each person should have an equal right to the 
most extensive total system of equal basic rights which are compatible 
with a similar system of liberty for all.9 
 
(ii) Natural law school. 
 
The supporters of natural law say that rights are derived from 'natural 
rights ' which individuals possessed in a 'state of nature '. Thus Locke 
regarded it as a fundamental law of nature that ' no one ought to harm 
another in his life, health, liberty or possessions' so that when individuals 
consented to having political authority imposed on them, they 
nevertheless retained their natural rights. Both the American Declaration 
of Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the 
Citizen assume that the government role is to safeguard natural rights and 
that where the state violates natural rights, it loses its right to rule and 
might be legitimately overthrown.10 
  
The natural law idea as a basis for rights emerged in the middle ages. This 
idea of natural law thinking can be traced to the classical Greeks and 
early Christians, but it was medieval catholic theology that turned these 
beginnings into an elaborated set of ideas. The natural law traditions hold 
that human beings have an essential nature which dictates that certain 
kinds of human goods are always and every where desired as necessary 
                                                 
9 .Richard Clayton and Hugh Tomlinson.The Law of Human Rights, 23(1st.ed.2000). 
10 . Ibid. 
for human flourishing; because of this essential nature we can think of 
there being common moral standards that govern all human relations, 
standards which can be discerned by the application of practical reason to 
human affairs. Practical reasoning tells us that these moral standards can 
generate rights and duties which crucially, are not justified by reference 
to, or limited in application by, any particular legal system, community, 
state, race, creed and civilization. In principle, every human being is 
subject to, and capable of discerning, the contents of natural law.11 
 
(iii) Positive law and natural law rights. 
 
The comparison between positive and natural rights can be drawn on the 
ground of the politics of these two positions. The politics of them are 
different. This difference can be summarized as follows: First, from the 
positive law point of view, individuals possess the rights they do because 
they are citizens of a particular state and the law of that state endows 
them with these rights. If they live in a state by the rule of law, they will 
be able to exercise these rights, and will have the support of the judicial 
system in so doing. This is all well and good, but the down side is that 
this state of affairs only pertains in those societies which are governed by 
the rule of law in the full sense of that term. This limitation does not exist 
when it comes to natural as opposed to positive law; here, to recapitulate 
rights rest on general moral standards established by the use of practical 
reasoning and apply in all relevant circumstances. The problem here is 
that precisely because rights in this sense are not associated with 
particular forms of society or government and therefore can be genuinely 
“Human ", they are also not associated with any particular enforcement 
mechanism. Secondly, whereas within a system of positive law the 
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content of rights can be described with some accuracy and precision, the 
rights that are actually mandated by general universal moral standards are 
quite likely to be a matter of controversy. The exercise of practical 
reasoning clearly does not lead to every one coming to the same 
conclusion on many important matters. 
  
(iv) The Modern Basis of Human Rights. 
 
At present human rights are understood as rights which belong to any 
individual as a consequence of being human, independently of acts of 
law. Every human being, simply because he or she is a human being, is 
entitled to something. Awareness of the existence of this type of rights 
finds its expression, in the output of various cultures at various times. 
However the real concept of the category of human rights started only 
after the Second World War. It became a common category in disputes of 
a practical kind, not only in the area of law, but also in politics, morality 
and religion. The modern concept of human rights is rooted in the 
experiences of legal authorization of law, and when some human beings 
were denied their status as such. An answer to these experiences was the 
emergence of the international law of human rights. The conception of 
human rights adopted then, nowadays provides the paradigm for under 
standing human rights not only in international law, but also in other 
areas of culture. This conception embraces an attempt at an explication of 
the reasons for the immense violations of fundamental rights, and a 
proposal of solutions which are to ensure that such violations will not 
recur in the future. The solutions incorporate both standards of conduct as 
well as postulates referring to the conceptions of a human being, the state 
and positive law. The international community's appreciation of the 
unique worth of every human being led not only to a concern for the 
elimination of elements destructive of the individual but also to a concern 
for the creation of the conditions which would enable him or her to 
develop and flourish.12 
 
(a) Basic Properties of Human Rights. 
 
     The first, identical, sections of the preamble to the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR) and to the international covenants on human 
rights mention that the " recognition of the inherent dignity and of the 
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the 
foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in the world". The preambles to 
the covenants add in the second section: ' these rights derive from the 
inherent dignity of human person'.  These identical sections of the 
preambles determine inherent dignity as the original source of human 
rights and state the main characteristic of human rights. It is useful to deal 
with each one separately. 
 
(b) Human Rights and Human Dignity.  
    
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 and the International 
Covenants on Human Rights 1966 do not speak of natural or positive law. 
Instead, they mention human dignity and dignity of human person as the 
foundation of freedoms and rights. These phrases are used today as an 
expression of a basic value accepted in a broad sense by all people. 
 
     As far as I know, there is no explicit definition of the expression "dignity 
of the human person" and "human dignity" in international instruments or 
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Justification, in Raija Hanski and Markku Suksi (ed.) An Introduction to the International Protection of 
Human Rights,3 (1999). 
national law, at least, of Sudan. Its meaning has been left to intuitive 
understanding. Conditioned in large measure by cultural factors. When it 
has been invoked in concrete situations it has been generally assumed that 
a violation of human dignity can be recognized even if the abstract term 
can not be defined.13  Everyone knows it when he sees it even if he can 
not tell you what it is. 
 
 An analysis of dignity may begin with its etymological root; the Latin 
"dignitas" translated as worth (in French, 'valeur'). One lexical meaning 
of dignity is ' intrinsic worth '. Thus when UN Charter refers to the 
“dignity and worth” of human person, it uses two synonyms for the same 
concept. The other instruments speak of “inherent dignity ", an expression 
that is close to “intrinsic worth ". 
  
What is meant by “respect “for “intrinsic worth” or inherent dignity of a 
person? “Respect” has several nuanced meanings; “esteem ", " deference 
", " a proper regard for " , " recognition of ". These terms have both 
subjective and objective aspect. Both are helpful in determining the 
meaning of “human dignity ", but it seems more useful to focus on the 
latter aspect. 
  
 One general answer to our question is to treat every human being as an 
end, not as a means. Respect for the intrinsic worth of every person 
should mean that individuals are not to be perceived or treated merely as 
instruments or objects of the will of others. This means that a high 
priority should be accorded in political, social and legal arrangements to 
individual choices in such matters as beliefs, way of life, attitudes and 
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general terms. The constitutions of many countries speak of the concept of dignity without determining 
its meaning e.g. Art. 1 of the German Constitution. 
conduct of public affairs. We may give it more specific content by 
applying it to political and psychological situations. In political context, 
respect for the dignity and worth of all persons and for their individual 
choices leads, broadly speaking, to strong emphasis on the will and 
consent of the governed. It means that the coercive rule of one or the few 
over the many is incompatible with a due respect for the dignity of the 
person. It also means that governments are not   to use coercion to impose 
beliefs and attitudes on those subjects.14 
 
 The concept of respect for dignity suggested above can also be given 
more specific meaning by applying it to actions of psychological 
significance. Indeed, nothing is so clearly violative of the dignity of 
person as treatment that demeans or humiliates them. This includes not 
only attacks on personal beliefs and way of life but also attacks on the 
groups and communities with which individuals are affiliated. Official 
statements that vilify groups or hold them up to ridicule and contempt are 
a form of psychological aggression resulting in a lack of respect by others 
for such groups and, perhaps even more insidious, destroying or reducing 
the sense of self-respect that is so important to the integrity of every 
human.15  
 
(c) The Main Characteristics of Contemporary Human Rights. 
 
The modern human rights are universal, that is, they belong to each and 
every human being, no matter what he or she is like. Universality is 
rooted in the inherent dignity and the inherency of rights. Although 
universality and inherency are decisive defining characteristics of human 
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rights16 they are those characteristics which are most often contested by 
philosophers and the theoreticians of law. They for example view the 
declaration of human rights as one that pretends to be universal, but 
actually reflects idealistic European political traditions. 
 
In spite of this hot debate it should be underlined that both universality 
and inherency are definitely recognized and emphasized at the level of 
practical discussion. 
  
The universality of human rights is not recognized in the universal 
declaration and international instruments only, but in the Islamic 
Jurisprudence as well. In the Qoran it is clearly indicated that” sons of 
Adam” are honored by God! “We have honored the sons of Adam; 
provided them with transport on land and sea; given them for sustenance 
things good and pure; and conferred on them special favors, above a great 
part of our creation” 17. It is noted that  using the phrase" sons of Adam" 
and not the phrase " human person " brings up a new positive dimension 
to human rights by showing that human beings are brothers irrespective 
of differences of religion, race, or language. Another positive dimension 
which widens the scope of human rights is found in the Qoran since 
“mercy " is required for all “creatures” and not only for the “sons of 
Adam ". “We sent thee not, but as a mercy for all creatures". 
 
Equality is another major element of the conception of human rights. 
Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: ‘All 
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are 
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another 
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in a spirit of brotherhood.’ Equal dignity refers to the fact that there are 
no human beings which are more human than other human beings. Equal 
dignity requires equal respect for an individual as an end in him / herself; 
equal concern for the individuals’ protection, possibilities and means of 
developments. If no one may be treated as a mere means, then both 
burdens and public goods should be distributed in a proportionally equal 
way. Proportionally, because respect for equality does not mean equal 
treatment in the sense of imposing equal aims and equal circumstances of 
action on individuals. Differences are desirable if there are well – 
grounded reasons justifying them. 
  
If we have recognized that equal and inherent dignity is a source of 
human rights, we have to accept as consequence that human rights are not 
based on any particular, contingent characteristic of a human beings: 
‘every one is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status’.18 If the justification of human rights were 
related to any such characteristic, its deprivation would have to mean a 
deprivation of the rights based on it. Therefore possession of human 
rights is not a consequence of, for example, being able to exercise free 
choices or to think logically. It should also be noted that, in accordance 
with the quoted article 1 every human being is recognized as free and 
national so being free and national are not properties related to some 
functional abilities but are inherent and may be regarded as an element of 
the foundation of uniqueness and dignity of human rights.19 
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It should be noted and pointed out that the principle of non-
discrimination, adopted in international law of human rights, refers to the 
relation between an individual and human rights. It expresses an idea that 
the differences between people do not matter as far as possession of 
human rights is concerned. Therefore, different treatment of individuals is 
discrimination only when it infringes human rights. 
 
Another important feature of the contemporary conception of human 
rights is the recognition of the indivisibility and interdependency of 
different rights. The Vienna Declaration states that ‘All human rights are 
universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The 
international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and 
equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis’.20 Each 
of the different aspects of a human being (physical, psychological, moral, 
spiritual, social. etc.) deserves attention. Individual development requires 
appropriate social, political, economic, cultural, and ecological 
conditions. Moreover, ensuring a minimum in one of these is usually 
indivisible for developing or preventing degradation in another; for 
example, ensuring minimal social standards is necessary for enjoyment of 
political rights. However, it seems to be impossible to define, for all cases 
and in general terms, the means for the prevention of the degradation of a 
human being or for ensuring his/her development should be distributed. 
The point of departure is a specific person living in unique circumstances. 
An aim of the formulated law is the well-being of a human being, and not 
abstract values. Acknowledgment of inherent dignity as the source of the 
rights is also an acknowledgment of the fact that rights are secondary to 
an individual and exist for the benefit of an individual as whole.21  
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 (d) Contemporary Human Rights and Natural Rights. 
 
James Nickel in 1987 identified three specific ways in which the concept 
of human rights differs from, and goes beyond that of natural rights. First, 
he argues that contemporary human rights are far more concerned to view 
the realization of equality as requiring positive action by the state, via the 
provision of welfare assistance, for example, advocates of natural rights, 
he argues, were far more inclined to view equality in formalistic terms, as 
principally requiring the state to refrain from 'interfering' in individual's 
lives. Second, he argues that, whereas advocates of natural rights tended 
to conceive of human beings as mere individuals, advocates of 
contemporary human rights are far more willing to recognize the 
importance of family and community in individual's lives. Third, Nickel 
views contemporary human rights as being far more ‘internationalist’ in 
scope and orientation than was typically found within arguments in 
support of natural rights, that is to say, the protection and promotion of 
human rights is increasingly seen as requiring international action and 
concern. The distinction drawn by Nickel between contemporary human 
rights and natural rights allows one to discern the development of the 
concept of human rights.22 
 
 4. Objections to the Idea of Human Rights. 
 
There are objections to the idea of human rights which can briefly be 
indicated as follows: First, the idea of human rights upon which the UN 
Declaration of Human Rights is based is of an ideal standard. The present 
economic and cultural condition of the so-called (Third World) precludes 
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peoples and governments within that world to be like liberal-democratic 
industrial societies in promoting and protecting human rights.23 
Secondly, human rights embody or reflect values and institutions which 
have their roots in the western tradition of culture and civilization. But 
the western tradition of culture and civilization is not the only one. There 
are a number of other such traditions e.g. the Buddhist, the Islamic, and 
the Hindu, each of which is based upon a great religion. Western 
civilization may be pre-eminent in science and technology, and in 
industry and commerce. But that does not justify erecting certain of its 
values and traditions, with their associate rights, into a universal 
standard.24 
Thirdly, the human rights focus ignores the very real threats to human 
will-being wrought by non-governmental agents and other states. Under 
non-ideal situations, such as civil war or non-compliance by other states, 
any human rights obligations of states are canceled. 
Fourthly, human rights protests ignore the risk of global instability 
created by foreign intervention in the domestic affairs of other states. 
Fifthly, respect for individual does not require respect for their "human 
rights" but instead, requires that foreigners do not interfere with the 
society which individuals accept. The tacit consent of individuals should 
be respected, even when their government fails to respect human rights. 
 
Addressing these objections one can say that a rejection of (Western) 
human rights on the basis of saying "we are not westerners" or on the 
ground that they reflect western liberal-democratic industrial societies 
values is unfortunate, for several reasons. We should not reject ideas or 
things because they are western this is not a good reason for rejecting 
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ideas, values or things. There are values which are agreed upon between 
all civilizations. Moreover many theories of human rights and moral 
tradition condemn the behavior which human rights serve to protect 
against. This is one point. 
Secondly, if human rights are inappropriately based on a western 
conception of the individual as self-interested and atomized, there are 
some arguments for individual rights that have appealed to an ideal of 
human flourishing which prized individual autonomy, or which focused 
on the individual as agent.25 However, they do not assume that 
individuals are fundamentally self-interested, nor do they dismiss the 
importance of social institutions for insuring the human good. 
Third, the focus of westerners on violations of civil and political rights, 
rather than on the whole panoply of rights may be due to that violations 
of social and economic rights are difficult to ascertain. In addition, it is 
not clear that media attention in the west about violations of economic 
and social rights is an effective way to improve the situation. Lack of 
criticism is therefore no indication that western ideologies regard social, 
economic, and cultural rights as less important. 
Fourth, the actual compliance with the laws of the land is not the final 
word regarding the legitimacy of social institutions. More would need to 
be said about reasons for actual acquiescence before accepting that this 
constitutes tacit consent in a significant sense- where basic liberties, 
freedoms and basic needs are not protected, silence can easily be due to 
fear. We would not agree with a totalitarian government’s interpretation 
of silence and acquiescence as tacit consent, if those who criticize the 
government risk immediate death or imprisonment. 
Fifth, objecting to domestic and international protests by appealing to 
importance of respecting culture begs several important questions. It must 
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be made clear whose culture is to be respected: that of the government or 
that of the citizens. And reasons should be presented for why culture 
should be respected when significant interests of individuals are at stake.  
Sixth, in so far as a government claims internal sovereignty over a 
territory and a population, it takes on a responsibility as the first protector 
of the population against threats and from third parties. On the other 
hand, international law acknowledges governments’ responsibilities may 
be different in times of crises and non-ideal situations such as civil war.26 
Seventh, as regards sovereignty, human rights violations are not properly 
regarded as 'internal' affairs of those states that are signatories to the 
international convention of human rights. The treaties have clearly moved 
human rights violations into sphere of international concern. Further, 
some legal scholars hold that some human rights have strong claim to the 
status of customary law binding regardless of signature. 
 
5. Religions and Human Rights. 
 
Under this title we will discuss human rights in Islam and Christianity 
only. Other religions have views on human rights but they will not be 
discussed here. 
 
(i) Human rights in Islamic Jurisprudence. 
 
In the traditional Islamic Jurisprudence many rights are granted in 
accordance with a strict classification based on faith and gender and are 
not given to human being as such. People are classified in terms of their 
religious beliefs; Muslims, ahl-alkitab or believers in a divinely revealed 
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scripture (mainly Christians and Jews), and unbelievers. In modern terms 
Muslims are the only full citizens of Islamic state, enjoying all the rights 
and freedoms granted by Sharia and subject to the limitations and 
restrictions imposed on woman.27  
 
In the Islamic traditional jurisprudence Muslims who repudiate their faith 
in Islam whether directly on indirectly, are guilty of a capital offence 
punishable by death. This law of apostasy can be used to restrict other 
human rights such as freedom of expression.28 Muslims sects which are 
deemed to be apostates from Islam may be punished with death penalty 
and their rights are actually violated.29 
 
The gist is that granting human rights on the basis of religious beliefs is 
contrary to the right of all people to equality. Apostasy is against freedom 
of religion and conscience, and may be exploited against freedom of 
expression. However writers on Islamic jurisprudence, nowadays, 
emphasize that there is no contradiction between Islamic principles and 
modern human rights. According to them rights are given to everyone in 
the Islamic state on the basis of humanity. They always mention verses 
from the Qoran to support their viewpoint e.g.:" we have honored the 
sons of Adam provided them with transport on land and sea; given them 
for sustenance things good and pure; and conferred on them special 
favors above a great part of our creations.30 “No coercion in religion …”31 
They always depend upon the second verse and many other verses from 
the Qoran and Sunna to say that there is no crime in Islam called 
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“apostasy.” They do not recognize it also because the "Hadith" that says 
he who repudiates his religion must be killed came to organize the 
relationship between Muslims who repudiate their religion and join non-
believers in a war against Muslims and those who still embrace Islam and 
believe in its principles.32 In addition, some writers see no difference 
between natural law (which is the permanent law of God) and Islam 
(which is the permanent and last law of God).33 
 
(ii) Human Rights and Christianity. 
 
There is a common ground on human rights. This emerged as part of the 
World Council of Churches study on human rights. The proposed list of 
human rights begins with the right to life. Then comes the right to cultural 
identity, followed by democracy, the right to dissent, personal dignity and 
freedom of religion. There is general consensus among Christian 
churches on these rights.34 
 
From a theological perspective, human rights have to do  with the 
realization that all people are created in the image of God, enjoying equal 
human worth. In order to realize and fulfill their destiny as the bearers of 
God’s image the fundamental rights of all people are to be fully claimed 
and concretely appropriated, recognizing that without certain basic rights 
people are not to realize their full God-given potential.35 
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Some Christian writers consider it a primary task of the church to 
facilitate Christians, to promote and appropriate the values of human 
rights culture. Christians emphasize that the doctrine of human rights is 
strongly connected to Christianity. In the words of Winston Ndungane: 
“The doctrine of human rights is man's attempt at exercising his 
responsibility as God's steward on earth in that it seeks to challenge all 
the injustice that distort the image of God in man. It is an attempt to 
establish a social condition where there are harmonious and peaceful 
relation among the people of the world, and where people are able to 
realize their full potential as God created them. There is some kind of 
relation that exists between the notion of human rights and the Christian 
doctrine of man…..”36 
 
According to sources I have come across recognition of human rights at 
least theoretically is not a problematic issue both in Christianity as we 
have seen above and original sources of Islam .i.e. Qoran and Sunna. This 
is not surprising since these two religions are revealed from God who is 
the creator of human beings. 
 
6-Conclusion 
 
The idea of human rights as it is understood today is a result of many 
developments in the history of mankind. The most important ones are 
natural law thinking and the trend of basing human rights idea on human 
dignity. The discussion among the philosophers of these two schools led 
to one outcome, that is, there are rights which can properly be called 
human rights. The strict respect of these rights plays a significant role in 
ending many of our problems and conflicts. 
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The objections to the idea of human rights arise from the political conflict 
between East and West and between South and North. This conflict will 
disappear if cultural and civilization dialogue is made by academic and 
strategic institutions and foundations. I have a strong conviction that the 
idea of human rights is going to be increasingly acceptable to so many 
inhabitants of the world. Religions and local cultures can positively be 
exploited to promote and protect human rights; and if it is not possible 
now to exploit some cultures and religions in realizing this aim, then the 
followers of these cultures and religions need to reform the existing 
concepts which are contrary to our modern concept of human rights. 
Unless they do that peacefully, it is expected that revolutions would be 
staged by persons whose human dignity is not protected and susceptible 
to violation.  
 
Chapter Two 
Classification of Human Rights 
 
1. Introduction. 
 
The previous chapter analyzed and discussed the historical roots of 
human rights. This chapter tries to discuss the different categories of 
human rights. If one gives a glance at the various documents that together 
form the codified body of human rights, he can identify and distinguish 
between three categories of human rights, namely; civil and political 
rights; economic, social and cultural rights, and new or third generation 
human rights. These categories and particularly the first two ones are the 
main topics of this chapter. 
 
2. Divisions of Human Rights into Three Categories. 
    
Internationally recognized human rights are often divided into different 
categories. One well-known distinction is between what is sometimes 
referred to as three generations of human rights, namely; civil and 
political rights (eighteenth century rights), economic, social and cultural 
rights (late nineteenth and early twentieth century rights) and a new set of 
rights such as the right of self-determination, the right to development, 
and the right to peaceful coexistence (late twentieth century rights). There 
are arguments for and against this classification. It is useful to discuss 
some of them here. 
 
(i) Arguments against this Classification. 
 This classification does not adequately reflect recent developments in the 
real world, legal practice of human rights, or human rights doctrine. Let 
us illustrate this by constructing the following case for consideration:-  
 
  Mr. X is a European Union citizen visiting relatives in another European 
Union country. Owing to an explosion in a chemical plant, he suffers 
from serious health problems, which later prove to have caused him a 
partial incapacity. He and the relatives he visited were forcibly evacuated 
after the explosion by the police from the house where they were living 
and they have to seek accommodation in a hotel. X’s health problems 
were greatly aggravated by the fact that, he, as a foreign national, was 
denied medical treatment in a local health centre run by semi-public 
health authorities and later also by a private clinic, as X did not have 
means to pay for the fees charged (X later returned to his own country 
where he received medical treatment, but this was too late for his 
complete rehabilitation). The local health care authorities claimed that the 
relevant national health legislation should be interpreted as granting only 
the states own citizen a subjective right to health care under the national 
health care and health insurance schemes, and that private health clinic 
had no obligation to treat foreign nationals. X brought a case before an 
administrative court challenging this interpretation and also arguing that 
it constituted a violation of EC law. The administrative court held that it 
lacked jurisdiction in such cases, which could not be brought before the 
court (other than as a liability claim for compensation under tort law). 
There was no appeal against this judgment. X subsequently started to 
make enquiries as to whether his human rights had been violated because 
of the actions of the national legislator, the local health authorities, the 
private clinic and the administrative court. In his contacts with state 
authorities, they denied that any internationally recognized human rights 
had been violated, adding that exclusion of foreigners from the national 
health scheme had been made as part of a policy to cut health and social 
costs, demanded by the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development as condition for loans and assistance.  
         
The case can not be easily fitted into the simplistic    categorization 
referred to above. Human rights which can be plausibly invoked in this 
context ( not necessarily implying that they could be invoked 
successfully) include the right to health, the right to social security, the 
right to protection against inhumane or degrading treatment, the right to 
freedom of movement, the right to privacy, the right to a fair trial, the 
right to effective domestic remedies, the right to protection against 
discrimination, including discrimination on the basis of nationality in a 
specific EU context, and finally environmental rights. This bundle of 
rights thus includes rights from all the three generation.37 
 
Another situation illustrating the indivisibility and interdependence of 
human rights is the case of armed conflicts. In such conflicts, 
international humanitarian law offers an additional source of law which 
may be applicable in a given situation. International humanitarian law, 
notably the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional 
Protocols of 1977, contains a great number of provisions providing for 
the human treatment of individuals hors de combat. No specific 
distinction is made here between civil and political rights on the one hand 
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and economic social and cultural rights on the other. Both categories of 
rights are covered by the humanitarian instruments.38 
 
Furthermore, there are some rights which are difficult to classify 
according to the traditional categories. A good example is property rights, 
which mainly from a historical and ideological point of view are often 
conceived as civil rights, but which in the preparation of the 1966 
covenants were considered in the context of the International Covenant 
on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) and not the 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR), only to be 
finally left out of the covenants altogether. Because of this controversial 
character the right to property is subject to particularly far-reaching 
limitation clauses. States enjoy a wide ‘margin of appreciation’ to restrict 
in the public interest, in the interest of society, or in the general interest of 
the community. The restriction might even entail the total expropriation 
of private property if the public interest in constructing motorways and 
railways so demand. Only article 21(2) of the American convention on 
human rights explicitly provides for just compensation in case of 
deprivation of property.39 
 
(ii) The Importance of Distinction between Different Categories of 
Human Rights. 
 
Firstly, we should not put aside the usefulness of human rights 
classification. It is useful to classify human rights into different groups 
for analytical convenience. Furthermore the characteristic of each 
category shows certain aspect of rights more or less commonly shared by 
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the rights belonging to the same category. Secondly, treating all human 
rights as of equal importance prohibits any attempts to resolve any 
conflict which can and does occur between rights. Take the example of a 
hypothetical developing country with severely limited financial and 
material resources. This country is incapable of providing the resources 
for realizing all of the human rights for all of its citizens, though it is 
committed to doing so. Thirdly, government officials wish to know which 
human rights are more absolute than others, which fundamental human 
rights should it immediately prioritize and seek to provide for? This 
question, of course, can not be answered if one sticks to the position that 
all rights are of equal importance. It can only be addressed if one allows 
for the possibility that some human rights are more fundamental than 
others. 
 
It should be admitted, however, that there is an important difference 
between civil and political rights on the one hand and most economic, 
social and cultural rights on the other, when it comes to international 
monitoring and implementation mechanisms. 
 
While reporting systems normally apply to economic, social, and cultural 
rights as well, only a limited number of these rights can be brought before 
international bodies in the form of complaints. The main exception 
consists of the economic, social and cultural dimensions of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (e.g. the right to education) and 
the CCPR, including the possibility of applying the general non-
discrimination clause in article 26 of the CCPR to economic, social and 
cultural rights as well, which can be brought before the European Court 
of Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee, respectively. There 
is an on-going discussion on an Additional Protocol to the CESR, 
establishing a complaints system for this covenant. In European 
community law, certain social rights (conditions of work, social security, 
etc.) may come before the Court of Justice of the European Communities 
mainly within the framework of the prohibition of discrimination (on the 
grounds of nationality or sex). In the future, there will probably be fewer 
differences between the two categories of human rights when it comes to 
international implementation as well.               
3. Civil and Political Rights. 
 
Civil rights are rights necessary for the establishment of individual’s 
autonomy, including liberty of the person; freedom of speech, thought 
and faith; the right to own property and to enter into contracts; and the 
right to be treated equally with others before the law. Political rights are 
rights empowering individual participation in political processes of a 
country. The right to elect and to be elected, equal access to civil service, 
and related civil rights such as freedom of association and speech are 
human rights without which no democratic political system can thrive.40 
 
The generally subscribed characteristics of this category are that the 
rights in this category are (a) negative and (b) immediately enforceable. 
They are negative in the sense that the rights of this kind are most often 
violated by positive actions of governments and that the best way to 
ensure the enjoyment of such rights is to require the governments to 
refrain from interfering with the life and freedoms of individuals. The 
rights in this category are also said to be immediately enforceable. If such 
rights are violated (most likely by government), the victims may bring the 
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matter to an appropriate authority (commonly a court) for immediate and 
effective relief and redress.41 
 
Civil and political rights are the most important and lasting achievements 
of the American and French revolutions in the late eighteenth century and 
of other bourgeois revolutions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Based on the rationalistic doctrine of natural law, according to which 
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and inalienable rights, 
civil and political rights are the legal expression of two different concepts 
of freedom; the ancient democratic concept of achieving collective 
freedom through active participation in the political decision-making 
process, and the modern liberal concept of achieving individual freedom 
by creating a private sphere for every human being which is to be 
protected against any undue interference by the state and other powerful 
actors, such as religions. In this sense political rights are the 
individualistic expression of democracy, the civil rights of liberalism. In 
the various bills of rights formulated following the American Revolution 
of 1776 and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the 
Citizen of 1789, both concepts of freedom are represented. With the rise 
of liberalism and capitalism in the nineteenth century, the democratic or 
political element of the first generation gradually lost ground, and the 
bourgeois concept of human rights seemed to be reduced to mere claims 
against state intervention.42 
 
Typical examples of political rights are the right to vote, to equal access 
to public service and to take part in the government of one’s country. 
Civil rights are somewhat more complex and range from the protection of 
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the individual’s physical, spiritual, legal and economic existence (right to 
life, physical integrity, privacy and dignity, freedom of thought, 
conscience, religion and opinion; right to nationality and recognition as a 
person before the law; right to own property) via classical freedom rights 
( liberty of person, freedom of movement, prohibition of slavery, freedom 
of expression ) to highly detailed procedural safeguards relating to fair 
trial and the rule of law in general. The category of "political freedoms" 
(freedom of expression, media, arts, assembly, association and so on) 
serves both concepts of democratic and liberal freedoms and thereby 
constitutes the link between civil and political rights. 
  
The rights and freedoms enumerated above are too difficult to be stated 
here. Let us discuss the right to life and political rights, to take two 
examples only for illustrating civil and political rights. 
 
(i) The Right to Life. 
 
The right to life is the supreme human right from which no derogation is 
permitted, even in time of war or public emergency. Nevertheless, it is 
not an absolute right such as, for example, that pertaining to the 
prohibition of torture. Many articles in so many conventions prohibit 
arbitrary deprivation of life, without defining which type of killing would 
be non-arbitrary. Article 2 of the European Convention of Human Rights 
prohibits intentional deprivation of life unless it results from the use of 
force which is no more than absolutely necessary in defense of any 
person from unlawful violence, in action lawfully taken for the purpose of 
quelling a riot or insurrection, or to prevent the escape of a person 
lawfully detained. In a case against the United Kingdom the European 
Court of Human Rights ruled by a majority of 10:9 that the intentional 
killing by members of the British security forces of three persons 
suspected of involvement in a bombing mission in Gibraltar violated 
Article 2 of the European Convention of Human Rights.43 The court held 
that, even when dealing with dangerous terrorists, operations to prevent 
the explosion of a car bomb must be organized in such a manner that the 
use of lethal force does not become unavoidable. 
 
Example of a violation of the right to life is the arrest or abduction, and 
subsequent arbitrary or summary execution, of a political opponent by 
members of the army, intelligence or police, as unfortunately happens on 
a systematic level in many countries of the world, in particular in military 
dictatorship as well as in the context of international and internal armed 
conflicts.44 
 
Article 6 (1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
states, for example, that the right to life of every human being shall be 
protected by law. The inherent right to life means that nobody should be 
arbitrarily killed by a state agent, by starvation, epidemics, poverty and 
similar natural or human-made disasters, or by ordinary crime. Of course, 
murder, homicide and similar crimes occur in every society and states 
cannot be held responsible for every assassination, but have an obligation 
to protect all human beings under their jurisdiction against such acts by 
enacting relevant criminal legislation with appropriate penalties and by 
establishing sufficient police, judicial and other law enforcement organs 
to prevent such criminal acts and bring the perpetrators to justice. 
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There are two controversial matters relating to the right to life; abolition 
of the death penalty and the question of abortion. Let us discuss them in 
turn. 
 
 
 
(a) Abolition of Death Penalty. 
 
Despite a clear trend towards abolition of the death penalty in 
international law and in the practice of many states, the execution of a 
person who was sentenced to death for a capital offence after a fair trial 
by a competent court does not amount to a violation of the right to life. 
While Article 2 (1) of the European Convention of Human Rights plainly 
excludes the death penalty  from the application of the right to life, the 
provisions of Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and Article 4 of the American Convention on Human 
Rights took certain developments into account and, therefore, contain a 
number of limitations; the death penalty may be imposed only for the 
most serious crimes; it shall not be re-established in states which have 
abolished it; it shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons 
under 18 years of age; it shall not be carried out on pregnant women; and 
every person sentenced to death shall have the right to apply for amnesty, 
pardon or commutation of sentence.45  
 
There is an international campaign for the abolition of the death penalty 
by amnesty international and other non-governmental organizations. This 
campaign led to the adoption of the second optional protocol to the 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights in 1989. The states 
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parties to this protocol are under the legal obligation, at least in time of 
peace, not to apply the death penalty and not to introduce it in the future. 
Unfortunately, only 40 states, mostly from Europe and Latin America, 
have ratified this protocol in 1999, whereas in other countries, such as 
China, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United States, the death penalty is 
applied in a huge or even increasing number of cases.46 
  
According to my own view point most of the Islamic states such as Iran 
refused to ratify this protocol for religious reasons. Death penalty is a 
punishment of many crimes in Islamic criminal law. The state under 
Islamic system is under a religious obligation to apply this penalty strictly 
because it is provided for in the Holy Qoran which is a supreme source of 
legal provisions. The international organizations will find it increasingly 
difficult to abolish this penalty in Islamic states. The possible solution is 
to renovate the present Islamic jurisprudence in the light of the general 
principles of Islam or otherwise to require a number of limitations such as 
those of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
American Convention on Human Rights. 
    
(b) Prohibition of abortion. 
 
 Another controversial issue related to the right to life, which can shortly 
be discussed in this chapter is the question of abortion. What can be said 
here is that article 4(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights 
protects the right to life, in general, from the moment of conception. The 
Inter-American Commission of Human Rights found that the decision of 
the United States Supreme Court legalizing abortion until the end of the 
                                                 
46 . Amnesty International, Abolition of Death Penalty World wide, Developments in 1994. October 
1995. 
first trimester did not constitute a violation of the right to life, article 6 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Right does not expressly 
determine the point at which the protection of life begins. From the 
travaux preparatoires of the covenant, it becomes clear that the unborn 
child was not to be protected from the time of conception. Even if the 
fetus is protected by the right to life, its rights have to be balanced against 
the rights of the mother.47 
  
As has been stated above, the protection of the right to life goes beyond 
the protection of arbitrary killing by state agents and the criminal 
prohibition of homicide offences. The obligation to ensure the right to life 
also extends to other threats to human life, either natural or human- made. 
 
(ii) Political rights. 
 
Political rights constitute the very essence of democracy in terms of 
subjective rights. The right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, 
directly or through freely chosen representatives, is the most direct 
expression of political freedom, as distinguished from the concepts of 
liberal or socialist freedom. Since democracy is, usually, functioning by 
means of representative participation, the most important political rights 
are the right to vote, the right to be elected and the right of equal access to 
public service. 
 
The right to vote and to be elected is a good example to illustrate the 
interdependence of states’ obligations to respect, to ensure and to protect. 
First of all, states are under an obligation to ensure that elections are held 
at periodic intervals, at least for parliaments and other bodies exercising 
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legislative functions. The duty to ensure the right to vote includes the 
obligation to provide by means of positive state action, for free, fair and 
secret elections on the basis of universal and equal suffrage. This also 
means the duty to guarantee that all persons who are entitled to vote, 
including the elderly, the sick, the disabled and persons deprived of their 
liberty actually have an opportunity to exercise this most important 
political right. 
Secondly, states shall refrain from interfering with free and fair elections 
by, for example, privileging certain political parties in their electoral 
campaigns, by committing  electoral fraud or by arbitrarily excluding 
voters or political parties. Only reasonably and non-discriminatory 
restrictions are permissible, such as the exclusion of aliens, minors, the 
mentally ill or persons convicted in court for certain crimes. Only in 
exceptional cases may certain parties be prohibited from participating in 
elections. Exclusion is not permitted with regard to illiterate persons, civil 
servants, pre-trial detainees; nor is exclusion on any discriminatory 
grounds such as sex, race, religion, property, social origin or political 
opinion permitted. 
Thirdly, states have a positive duty to protect voters from undue pressure 
by private individuals and groups. In particular, the principle of free and 
fair elections means that voter and candidates are not intimidated, 
harassed and threatened by powerful parties and pressure groups. During 
elections, the strict observance of a secret ballot is the best guarantee of 
ensuring free elections. 
 
The right of equal access to public service obliges states to provide for 
minimum procedural guarantees, such as publicly announcing vacant 
positions and ensuring a selection procedure which grants all applicants 
equal chances of access according to objective criteria. In Stalla 
Costa.v.Uruguay, the Human Rights Committee held that reasonable 
measures of affirmative action (preferential treatment of persons who had 
been arbitrarily dismissed during the military regime) did not constitute 
discrimination.48The rule in this case can be extended by analogy to be 
applied to temporary measures aimed at realizing equality between men 
and women such as CEDAW provisions. 
 
It is clear from what has been discussed that political rights are basic to 
democracy. It is necessary to guarantee them if we are to witness real 
political life in a free and democratic society. 
 
4. The Diversity of the World and the Future of Civil and Political 
Rights. 
 
States, like the societies they represent, are unequal. The principle of 
sovereign equality mitigates only some of the effects of this factual 
inequality. In this context a distinction can be drawn between three 
different categories of states existing side by side in the contemporary 
world: pre-modern, modern, and post modern. Prominent examples of 
pre-modern states are Afghanistan, Liberia, and Somalia, but many 
others, like Sudan, are struggling in this post-imperial chaos also. Most 
states still belong to the modern world with its balance of power politics, 
its noninterference principle, and other traditional attributes of 
sovereignty. The post-modern world, to which the Western European 
states belong, is characterized by a breakdown in distinctions between 
domestic and foreign affairs; by mutual interference in traditional 
domestic affairs; by the rejection not only of the use of force but of the 
very idea of the use of force to resolve disputes among themselves, by the 
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growing irrelevance of boarders; by security based on transparency 
openness, and interdependence. In the post modern states human rights 
problems are quite different from those found in modern or pre-modern 
states. An important way of advancing civil and political rights in post 
modern societies as well as in many modern societies is not so much to 
create new rights or even deepen the interpretation of existing rights but 
to create the conditions that are conducive to the de facto enjoyment of 
declared rights by all citizens and non-citizens alike. It is not sufficient 
for government simply to abstain from interference in the civil rights and 
liberties of individuals. Approaching civil and political rights as negative 
rights does not guarantee their full and equal enjoyment by all 
individuals. The poor, the illiterate, and the unemployed are not able to 
enjoy civil and political rights to the extent as their rich and well-
educated fellow citizens, because there is a mutual interdependence 
between civil-political and socio-economic rights.49  
 
Other human rights issues that may become topical in advanced post-
modern states are the further extension of rights to immigrants, special 
attention to the delicate problems of ethnic and religious minorities, as 
well as concern for human rights in other parts of the world. Processes of 
economic globalization have exacerbated the problem of immigration in 
as much as free capital movement and restrictions on the movement of 
labor do not fit well together. As one writer writes, “current immigration 
policy in the highly developed countries is increasingly at odds with other 
major policy framework in the international system. There is a 
combination of drives to create boarder-free economic spaces yet 
intensify boarder control to keep immigrants and refugees out”.50 The 
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European Union’s experience may show the way for other post-
modernizing states. Giddens believes that the “citizenship laws need to be 
changed and major cultural shifts made”.51 
 
In modern states, where material conditions for civil and political rights 
usually are significantly evolved, the development of human rights 
cultures and democratic traditions will be the most important tasks. In 
some of these societies, human rights must compete with religious and 
historical traditions hostile to human rights culture. There are countries 
especially in the Middle East which are rich in monetary terms, but 
socially and politically backward (rich undeveloped society). The 
exhaustion of their oil resources may quite possibly be accompanied by a 
social explosion that could negatively affect human rights. 
   
In pre-modern states, the main task should be the creation of elementary 
conditions for the introduction of basic civil and political rights. In some 
cases, this will mean trying to end civil wars and inter-ethnic conflicts. 
Without the eradication of extreme forms of poverty, the elevation of 
education standards, and the resolution of the most acute health problems, 
it will be impossible to speak of real civil and political rights. At the same 
time, it would be wrong to justify all the violations of human rights by 
reference to poverty. The corruption of local political elites and 
repressions are also responsible.  
  
5. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
 
(i) What are Economic, Social and Cultural Rights? 
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There is no clear-cut definition of economic, social and cultural rights. 
Looking at the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 and the 
International Covenant on Economical-Social and Cultural Rights 1960 
one can say that they include the right to an adequate standard of living, 
the right to property, the right to work, the right to education, the right to 
take part in cultural life, the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific 
progress and its applications, and the right to social security. 
  
Economic, Social and Cultural rights are often described as (a) positive 
and (b) programmatic or promotional. They are considered positive 
because the role of governments has to be positive in order to realize 
these rights. For instance, the right to education, one of the typical 
examples of economic, social and cultural rights, cannot be realized 
unless governments provide school buildings, teachers and textbooks. 
The rights in this category are also said to be programmatic in the sense 
that they represent aspirations or policy objectives rather than justiceable 
rights whose violations can be remedied immediately.52 These three 
overlapping categories of rights are sometimes treated in a similar way, in 
relation to civil and political rights, for example, all are marginal.53  
 
(ii) Argument against ESCRs. 
 
One argument often used against economic, social and cultural rights 
from a legalistic point of view is that they are not justiceable. This means 
that they are not suitable for handling by courts or similar institutions. 
Several arguments can be made against this. 
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53 . Marginalisation of economic ,social and cultural rights will be discussed in detail in this chapter. 
First, many aspects of economic, social and cultural rights can be made 
justiceability, as can be seen in many domestic legal systems. Second, the 
concept of justiceability is in itself very fluid and reflects differences in 
legal traditions and in philosophical views about the relationship between 
courts and the state. Third, human rights can still be human rights even 
when they are not in all aspects justiceable. Furthermore, rights which are 
not initially justiceable can gradually become so by concretization both 
through practice and through more detailed standard-setting at the 
international level and by legislation at the national level. 
 
(iii) The Importance of ESCRs. 
 
There is an historical and practical reason for emphasizing the importance 
of economic, social and cultural rights. 
  
First, despite a rhetorical commitment to the indivisibility and 
interdependence of human rights, the international community including 
the international human rights movement, has treated civil and political 
rights as more significant and has consistently neglected economic, 
social, and cultural rights.54 Consequently, in the debates particularly 
under the item "violation of human rights" both at the Commission on 
Human Rights and the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities, most accusations of serious human rights 
violation, often made by Western- based human rights non-governmental 
organizations are related to civil and political rights. The pleas made by 
the delegates or experts coming from the developing world to focus more 
on the tragic situations of violations of basic economic, social and 
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cultural rights, often stemming from extreme poverty, are largely 
ignored.55 
Secondly, because of their relative novelty, economic, social and cultural 
rights have not yet been well defined. As we have mentioned at the outset 
of this section, there is no clear-cut definition. Gomez writes that" the 
norms of economic, social and cultural rights are vague and lack the 
precision of their counterpart in the Civil and Political Rights Covenant. 
The norms are vague because they have not yet received sufficient 
attention from the courts, academics, or other agencies. Civil and political 
rights, on the other hand, have long been the subject of interpretation by 
courts and other agencies, and have thus acquired a degree of clarity”.56 
 
It is interesting to remember here that the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights does not explicitly make a distinction between civil and 
political rights, on the one hand, and economic, social and cultural rights 
on the other. The UDHR includes traditional human rights, largely 
categorized as civil and political rights, and it also includes six further 
articles to provide for economic, social, and cultural rights. 
    
(iv) National Origins of ESCRs. 
 
The formulation of economic and social rights in the Universal 
Declaration is significantly influenced by the experience of 
industrialization in Western countries. The economic, social and cultural 
rights emerged for the first time in some European states since the 
eighteenth century. At this time three different systems of welfare 
capitalism emerged and, consequently, three different approaches to 
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economic and social rights: the welfare state is a system of social 
stratification which actively orders social relations. The   earliest model, 
which still has its followers, developed poor laws and provided poor 
relief, but at extremely low levels. This had the effect of maintaining a 
social stigma for those who were given relief, with a view to preventing 
persons from wanting to obtain social assistance. It was based on an 
extreme reliance on the market and on contractual relations, coinciding 
with the elimination of the feudal system which pushed large numbers of 
people off the land where they had previously made their living as serfs 
and, later, as peasants without property. Having lost their means of 
livelihood, they became a cheap commodity for the emerging capitalist 
society. Only those who could not be emerged even at the lowest possible 
wages mainly in mining and in the budding industries, were given a 
modicum of poor relief in order not to die from starvation. This was an 
extreme reliance on the market, and any kind of action which could 
interfere with labour as a cheap commodity was ideologically resisted. 
Remnants of this still exist in means-tested social assistance approaches, 
in societies where to be ‘on welfare is still considered a stigma’. 
 
A second approach was promoted by conservative reformers through the 
social insurance model. It sought to achieve two simultaneous results in 
terms of stratification. The first was to consolidate divisions among 
wage-earners by legislating distinct programs for different class and 
status groups, each with its own conspicuously unique set of rights and 
privileges which was designed to accentuate the individual's appropriate 
station in life. The second objective was to tie the loyalties of the 
individuals directly to the monarchy or to the central state authority. 
  
The third approach is the universalistic system. Under this system, all 
citizens are endowed with similar rights system irrespective of class or 
market position. The system is meant to cultivate cross-class solidarity, a 
solidarity of the nation. 
 
From the above, it can be seen how economic and social rights emerged 
as a consequence of industrialization. 
(v) Marginalization of ESCRs. 
 
One of the most striking features of contemporary human rights is the 
juridical marginalization of social, economic and cultural rights. At the 
national level, a variety of institutions, procedures and constitutional 
arrangements, free and fair elections, bills of rights, habeas corpus human 
rights commissions, ombudsmen and so on have evolved over generations 
to promote and protect civil and political rights. Although these devices 
remain inadequate and flawed, they are considerably more widespread 
and sophisticated than legal arrangements designed to implement social 
and economic rights. This does not mean that there are not jurisdictions in 
which some of theses devices, like human rights commissions, extend to 
both categories of rights but in practice even these exceptional cases 
devote most of their resources to civil and political rights.57  
 
The same discrepancy-between civil and political rights on the one hand 
and economic social and cultural rights on the other- is also apparent at 
the international level. Although only in its infancy, international human 
rights law is evolving procedures which, in some circumstances, 
effectively protect civil and political rights. Consider, for example, the 
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numerous cases heard by the UN Human Rights Committee. By contrast, 
comparable international procedures for the legal protection of economic, 
social and cultural rights are weak and underutilized. The African Charter 
on Human and Peoples Rights establishes what amounts to a complaints 
procedure in relation to social rights, yet relatively few complaints 
alleging the violation of economic, social and cultural rights have been 
submitted to its monitoring body. The discrepancy between these two 
categories of rights is not only institutional and procedural, but 
normative. In relation to civil and political rights, a considerable body of 
jurisprudence has evolved which elaborates what these rights mean. 
Although incomplete and sometimes inconsistent, the jurisprudence is 
detailed. Much is known for example about the contemporary meaning of 
the right to a fair trial. The same cannot be said for second generation 
human rights. In many cases, their normative content remains obscure. 
We know relatively little, for example, about what the international right 
to health protection means.58 
  
It has become clear from what is mentioned that second generation rights 
are marginalized both at the national and international level. The UDHR 
as we have seen before does not distinguish between civil, political, 
economic, and cultural rights. So, if the letter and spirit of the declaration 
are to be respected, social and economic rights must to be brought from 
the margins into mainstream human rights promotion and protection. 
 
(vi) Realization of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. 
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The central issue that dominates the study of the international law of 
human rights is that of enforcement.59 This is as true of civil and political 
rights as it is of economic, social and cultural rights. Many economic, 
social, and cultural rights are often not easy to realize, and enforcement, 
such as through court decisions which are workable in many cases 
involving the violations of civil and political rights, does not work well to 
achieve a high level of enjoyment of such rights. The reasons for this 
particular difficulty in realizing economic, social, and cultural rights are 
multiple. 
   
 First, to realize economic, social and cultural rights, concerned 
governments must have the necessary resources, which many in the 
developing countries do not possess at all or in any significant quantity. 
The irony is that many governments in the developing world do not 
always make the best use of the available resources, which are very 
limited, for improving the general living conditions of people under their 
rule. Instead, they often misallocate their scarce resources for unnecessary 
large military expenditure and personal luxury, and waste them also by 
corrupt practices. Thus the excuses often given by the governments of the 
developing countries, to the effect that they can not provide adequate 
food, housing, and clothing to their people for lack of funds and 
resources, need to be studied and analyzed carefully. In some cases, the 
governments genuinely need such funds and resources for carrying out a 
sensible policy to improve the leaving conditions of the public, 
particularly the poorest of them. In such a case it is the responsibility of 
the international community in general and the developed countries in 
particular, to provide such governments truly in need with necessary 
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funds and resources. On the other hand, if governments of the developing 
countries are not making sincere efforts to ensure the basic human needs 
of the people by wasting their resources, the responses of the international 
community and the developed countries should be cautious.60 
 
 A second reason for difficulty of realizing economic, social, and cultural 
rights is related to the bureaucratic and institutional complexity of 
implementing the policies necessary to realize them. Whilst there are only 
limited governmental ministries and departments traditionally involved in 
civil and political rights, such as the courts, ministries of justice, the 
police, the military and ministries of foreign affairs, there are many 
diverse ministries and departments involved in the realization of 
economic, social and cultural rights. In addition to courts, ministries of 
justice, and ministries of foreign affairs, which are concerned with both 
categories of human rights, ministries of finance, labor, education, 
economic development and trade, and health and welfare are also 
involved at a minimum in respect of economic, social, and cultural rights. 
The complexity of the institutional set-up of economic, social, and 
cultural rights is problematic in the following manner: (a) many of these 
concerned ministries have not been hitherto involved in human rights 
affairs and therefore are human rights ignorant or sensitive;61(b) because 
of the compartmentalization, the officials in these ministries tend to show 
an attitude of evading responsibility by saying that the realization of 
economic, social, and cultural rights is not within their jurisdiction or 
mandate, typical bureaucratic traits all over the world; and (c) there is no 
central governmental office or minister in charge of formulation and 
implementation of a coherent and integrated national policy for 
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economic, social, and cultural rights, which leads to the conclusion that 
there should be a national institution at the ministerial level to coordinate 
the activities of various ministries and department concerned with the 
realization of economic, social, and cultural rights.62 
  
 A third difficulty is related to the diversity and complexity of the 
organizations, and agencies involved in the realization of economic, 
social, and cultural rights.63They are of different nature with different 
mandates, power, functions, and resource bases. This is a good thing in a 
way because there are so many different actors working for the realization 
of economic, social, and cultural rights. However, it also causes a 
problem of coordination of their activities. Especially in international 
society where a central governing authority is lacking, the coordination of 
the activities of actors so diverse and independent is not an easy task. It 
seems that the United Nations, particularly the General Assembly and the 
ECOSOC, could play a major role in the coordination of such activities. 
 
In order to overcome the difficulties mentioned above, national and 
international efforts should be done not only by governments and UN, but 
by peoples and NGOs as well. 
 
 
 
 
6- Third Generation Rights. 
 
(i) What are third generation rights? 
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 The final set of rights to be discussed in this chapter is what is called 
“third generation rights”.64 The rights of the third generation are seen as 
really collective rights, based on notions of international solidarity and 
relating to global structural problems rather than individual cases.    
65Examples of this generation rights are the right of self-determination, 
the right to development and the right to peaceful coexistence.  
 
The third category rights are different from the first and second category 
rights in that the first and the second category rights are individual rights 
whereas the rights in the third category are said to be people's rights and 
group rights. For example, the right of self determination and the right to 
development, two typical rights in this category, belong to peoples rather 
than individuals. While admitting that such collective rights are rights 
clearly recognized and established under international law, it is not yet 
generally agreed whether they belong to human rights. Human rights 
stem from human dignity. Groups usually do not share the same dignity 
with individuals. It is absolutely correct to talk about peoples rights, but 
to argue that they are a part of human rights, more theoretical elaboration 
may be needed in order to obtain general support. 
 
Rights of solidarity such as the right to peace, the right to development 
and environmental rights are new rights which are not expressly 
recognized by the 1966 covenants. Sometimes rights that are indeed 
recognized under the covenants, such as the right of self-determination or 
the right to food, are added to the list of third generation rights as it is 
noted from the example I mentioned at the outset of this section. It is 
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assumed that these rights should benefit not only individuals but also 
groups and peoples and that their realization requires global cooperation 
based on international solidarity. 
  
(ii) The Adoption of the Declaration on the Rights to Development 
  
A landmark in the enunciation of new human rights occurred when, on 4 
December 1986, the General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the 
Right to Development. The right to development had been in gestation 
since at least 1981, when the Commission on Human Rights established a 
working group of experts which had also received very substantial inputs 
from non-governmental organizations. Of all the various new rights 
which have been proposed, the right to development has attracted the 
greatest scholarly and diplomatic attention. The peoples and states of the 
world have a duty and major task of finding concrete ways and means to 
develop the right to development.66 
 
It is important to mention that article 22 of the African Charter provides 
that all people shall have the right to their  economic, social and cultural 
development with due regard to their freedom and identity and the equal 
enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind.  Furthermore the Charter 
puts an obligation on the states parties to it to ensure the exercise of the 
right to development. This obligation, according to the provisions of the 
Charter can be achieved individually or collectively. 
  
The right to development and other similar new rights should not be seen 
in isolation. While they are disputed as true human rights per se, they at 
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least relate to a number of internationally recognized human rights. The 
right to development can, in fact, be seen as an umbrella concept which 
covers most of the existing human rights, including civil and political 
rights. The right to peace can be tackled in the context of the right to life. 
The right to a satisfactory environment can be broken down into more 
specific environmental rights which can be dealt with in the context of 
rights such as the protection against inhuman and degrading treatment 
and the right to privacy. 
 
 
7- Conclusions. 
 
The emergence of the different categories and generations of human 
rights into existence related, generally, to different stages in the history of 
mankind and the European nations in particular. The various 
circumstances under which individuals and peoples lived had their effect, 
and played a serious role in the appearance of what are today called 
generations and categories of human rights. Where there was need to 
liberate individuals and societies from the oppression of kings and 
empires, civil and political rights had come into being. The fixation of 
those rights was through the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. Since that time states have become under an international 
obligation to respect civil and political rights. When the industrial 
revolution had broken out in the West then the need for economic and 
social rights came into existence. The rights that governments recognized 
and protected after the industrial revolution were the first seeds of rights 
written down in the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights. The third generation rights which are in the throes of 
birth and not yet completely agreed upon reflect a new historical stage in 
the life of at least many peoples and nations. There is need for much more 
international cooperation and solidarity, and since there is such a need I 
expect that new international conventions on collective rights will be 
adopted in the near future. At that time I hope that new rights will appear. 
People may see a fourth generation of human rights. 
 
In short, the various types and categories of human rights are a 
consequence of important turning points in our history as human beings. 
The existence of these different rights simultaneously does not 
necessarily mean that all people in actuality need them. Europeans for 
example do not need to emphasize or to claim the right to development, 
but most Africans and Asians urgently need it. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Three 
Protection of Human Rights through National Courts 
 
1. Introduction. 
  
The previous chapter dealt with the various categories of human rights. 
This chapter will go further to analyze and clarify the role the judiciary 
can play in protecting these rights. It will discuss the implementation of 
international law in domestic courts, the judicial review of legislation, the 
arguments for and against protecting human rights through national 
courts, the protection of human rights in the courts of some countries and 
finally it will state the remedies that national courts grant for human 
rights violation.  
 
2- International Law before Domestic Courts. 
 
There is wide gap between practices of different states on domestic 
implementation of the norms of international law, especially international 
human rights norms, which need to be narrowed down. There are two 
basic theories adopted mainly by the United Kingdom and the United 
States of America. Let us illustrate the position in each country 
separately. 
 
(i) The United States of America (The monism theory). 
 
The constitutional position of domestic implementation or application of 
international law in the United States is found in article 6, section 2 of the 
U.S. Constitution which provides that "....all treaties made, or which shall 
be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby ...." 
However, division of treaties into self-executing and non-self-executing 
and discretion of the organs of the state to declare any treaty non-self-
executing has substantially narrowed the constitutional scope for direct 
application of treaties.67 
 
The doctrine of non-self-executing treaties is, in fact, an aspect of the 
doctrine of “political question”. It affirms that certain treaty provisions, 
like certain provisions of customary international law and certain 
provisions of the constitution, are of such a character that the court leaves 
their interpretation and application to the political organs of the 
government - the President or Congress - and applies whatever decision 
these organs may make. In practice, the doctrine of non-self-executing 
treaties has been applied only to preserve the constitutional rights of the 
political organs of the Federal Government- the President, the Congress, 
and especially the House of Representatives which does not normally 
participate in treaty-making in matters which for historical or practical 
reasons have been considered within the competence of these organs. One 
of the examples for this is the treaty provisions which require 
appropriations. These provisions can only be executed by Congress. 
Treaty provisions referring to tariffs, to the use of military forces, to the 
organization of tribunals, and to the establishment of criminal jurisdiction 
have usually been regarded as non-self-executing.68 
 
 Looking at the issue of incorporation the United States courts are likely 
to look to international law in deciding cases coming before them in 
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several kinds of situations: First: under article vi of the United States 
Constitution, treaties are the "supreme law of the land". Consequently, a 
United States court will directly apply a rule provided in what it regards 
as a “self-executive” treaty without any necessity for further statutory 
implementation. However, if the court decides that the treaty or treaty 
provision is not self-executing, it will not directly apply the rule, absent 
implementing legislation. In determining  whether a treaty or treaty 
provision  is to be interpreted as self-executing , the court will look at 
various factors , including  the nature of the treaty or treaty provision, 
whether the treaty establishes individual rights which are capable of 
judicial interpretation and enforcement without further implementing 
legislation , the language of the treaty and so forth. Secondly, customary 
international law will be treated by American courts as part of “the law of 
the land” ;69  Thirdly , domestic legislation may in some cases expressly 
or impliedly refer to or direct  the United States  courts to apply 
international rules, definitions , or standards , and courts will of course 
have to look to international law to implement these statutory directives: 
Fourthly , even where United States courts do not regard a particular rule 
of international law as directly incorporated  into domestic law , they may 
nevertheless look to international law for expressions of government 
policies or interests widely accepted standards, or experience relevant to 
their decisions.  In particular, the courts recognize the existence of United 
States international obligations to other nations under treaties and 
customary international law and if possible, will seek to interpret 
ambiguous statutes or reach decisions in ways which are consistent, 
rather than in conflict, with such international obligations.70 
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In practice, there is a case in which a United States court has held a 
human rights-type obligation in a treaty to be “self-executing” and thus 
directly applicable without the need for implementing legislation - the 
1974 decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
in People of Saipan Rel. Guerro. V. United States Department of 
Interior.71 That case involved a challenge by certain Micronesian citizens 
to a lease executed by the United States High Commissioner for the Trust 
Territory of the Pacific permitting an airline to construct and operate a 
hotel on public lands in Saipan. The plaintiffs argued that the lease 
violated the provision of the United States-United Nations Trusteeship 
Agreement under which the United States held the Trust Territories, 
which, inter alia, obliged the United State to promote the economic 
advancement of the inhabitants and protect them against the loss of their 
land and resources. The court held that the Trusteeship Agreement was 
self-executing and constituted source of rights enforceable by individuals 
in a domestic court. There are other cases that have gone the other way. 
The leading case is Sei Fujii V. State,72 in which plaintiffs challenged the 
constitutionality of certain Californian laws discriminating against the 
ownership of lands by aliens ineligible for citizenship (principally 
Japanese and Chinese aliens) on the ground, inter alia, that these laws 
were contrary to the human rights provisions of the United Nations 
Charter. This contention initially met with success in a lower California 
court, which in 1950 held the Charter provisions to be self-executing. 
However, in 1952, this decision was reversed on appeal by the California 
Supreme Court, which expressly held the human rights provisions of the 
Charter to be non-self-executing, but went on to strike down the laws as 
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violative of the “equal protection” clause of the United States 
Constitution. 
 
As regards the direct incorporation of customary international human 
rights law into United States domestic law, experience has again been 
sparse. The most relevant case is Rodriguez.v.Wilkinson.73 The case 
involved a habeas corpus petition by a Cuban who came to the United 
States in June 1980 seeking admission as a refugee. At the time 
Rodriguez left Cuba, he was serving a sentence for attempted burglary 
and had prior convictions for theft. On this basis, the immigration 
authorities determined he was an excludable alien and ordered him 
deported to Cuba. Upon Cuba’s refusal to accept him, he was detained, 
pending deportation to Cuba, in a maximum security federal penitentiary 
at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He sought release on the grounds that this 
continued indefinite detention under these circumstances violated 
prohibitions against arbitrary imprisonment in both the United States 
Constitution and customary international human rights law. The District 
Court found that since Rodriguez had not been admitted into USA he was 
not entitled to constitutional protection against arbitrary imprisonment.74 
However, the court, clearly seeking some basis for relief, went on to hold 
that the customary international law of human rights, as evidenced by a 
variety of international agreements, declarations, and other sources, 
accorded everyone the right to be free from arbitrary detention or 
imprisonment; that this rule was part of the law of “the land”; and that, 
consequently, it provided a basis upon which the court could order the 
prisoner’s release, which it did. To lawyers interested in using 
international human rights standards to broaden domestic human rights 
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protection, this was a path breaking and exciting decision. It suggested 
that individuals within the United States could invoke not only the rights 
expressly guaranteed by the constitution, but also such additional 
protections as might be regarded by the courts as part of customary 
international law. 
 
According to what is mentioned above incorporation may be direct or 
indirect. Recognition of the direct integration of human rights standards 
for judicial decision-making will guarantee more adequately both the 
fulfillment of international obligation and the effective implementation of 
constitutional rights. The direct incorporation of human rights law into 
U.S.A Constitutional law has occurred through article vi, clause 2 of the 
Constitution. Indirect incorporation of human rights law into U. S 
constitutional law has occurred through use of human rights as relevant 
standards of constitutional rights and rights content. Thus, human rights 
law has been utilized either to identify the existence of rights or, as an 
interpretive guide, to further identify or clarify the more detailed content 
of constitutional rights. In several cases there has been an express 
reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, although it is not 
clear whether the justices intended to apply the Declaration as a guide for 
interpreting the U.N. Charter and were thus using, indirectly, the direct 
incorporation approach or as a relevant set of standards for the 
determination and application of constitutional rights and were thus 
integrating the Declaration into judicial decision-making through an 
indirect incorporation approach. What is perhaps more important is the 
fact that the Universal Declaration has been used, although it is also 
significant that the phrase “human rights” has appeared in constitutional 
decisions even before the U.N. Charter (i.e. Before 1945) and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (i.e. before 1948) . 
 (ii) The United Kingdom’s approach (the dualism school). 
 
The United Kingdom’s approach towards implementation of international 
law is dualistic. Treaties in U.K. are never self-executing. They are 
applied through transformation i.e. specific adoption by enabling 
legislation, when necessary. So far as it concerns human rights, the 
government in U.K has always insisted that “the very rights and freedoms 
recognized by other systems are inherent in the United Kingdom’s legal 
system and protected by it and by Parliament”. However, there has been 
growing criticism of U.K.’s human rights performance of standards 
contained in the European Convention on Human Rights. In view of this 
development and pressure both from inside and outside, the U.K adopted 
European Human Rights Convention Act in 1998 incorporating the 
provisions of the European Convention. It is considered a major 
development and progressive shift in its human rights implementation 
policies. Customary international law, on the other hand, is considered 
part of common law, but to the extent that it is not conflicting with 
statutes. In principle, they are to be directly applied by the courts.75 
 
If no implementing legislation is enacted international conventional law 
may still be relevant to the interpretation of domestic law, through the 
operation of the presumption that the Parliament does not intend to 
violate its international obligations, or that statutes will not be interpreted 
as violating international law, where possible.76 
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The question is when is domestic legislation to be considered as 
implementing a convention so that the treaty in whole or part is the law of 
the land? There are a number of possibilities including the existence of 
legislation implementing a treaty but containing no reference to it. 
According to Ian Brownlie, a statute may directly enact the provisions of 
the international instrument, which will be set out as a schedule to the 
Act. Alternatively, he says, the statute may employ its own substantive 
provisions to give effect to a treaty, the text of which is directly enacted. 
In latter situation, the international convention may be referred to in the 
long and short titles of the Act and also in the preamble and schedule.77  
 
(iii) The International Law before Sudan Courts. 
 
The Sudan has ratified a number of international and regional instruments 
in which human rights are expressly provided for. It has ratified the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights on 21October1987 which 
contains economic and social rights as well as civil and political rights 
and thus the individuals in Sudan have a right of enjoying all rights set 
out in that Charter. At the international level our country in 1986 ratified 
the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights and the 
Protocol attached to it and the International Convention on Economic, 
Social and cultural Rights. Therefore, these two conventions have become 
a part of our national law and we, as nationals, have a right to enjoy the 
rights stated there. The Sudan has, within the provisions of the 
international and regional instruments mentioned above, agreed to 
guarantee the rights set out in all these instruments. 
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 In practice there are no human rights cases raised before the courts and 
as far as I know there is no clear viewpoint on whether our judges can 
directly protect the rights included in the international conventions. I have 
met more that two of the Appeal Court judges and they did not provide 
me with information. But the Supreme Court in the case of Joseph A. 
Garang and others v. The Supreme Commission and others78   stated that; 
in the view of the new constitution, fundamental human rights were not 
created by the state, but are eternal and universal institutions, common to 
all mankind and antedating the state and founded upon natural law. 
Unlike the old constitution based on legal positivism, the new 
constitution has a natural law foundation the supra constitutional 
character of natural law is clearly expressed in its preamble, declaring 
that this (the principle of democracy) is a universal principle of mankind 
upon which this constitution is founded. The judges stated that they reject 
and revoke all constitutions, laws, ordinances and prescripts in conflict 
herewith. The sanctity of natural law is carried a step further by 
conferring upon the courts, especially the Supreme Court, the power of 
Judicial review. Fundamental rights derived from natural law are written 
into the constitution and the constitution provides the court with power to 
review any act violating those rights. The Supreme Court is popularly 
called the guardian of the constitution and it is in fact not unreasonable to 
regard the Supreme Court as a bulwark of human rights. 
 
There are other cases such as the case of Asma Mahmoud Mohamed Taha 
v. S. G,79 in which reference was made either to natural law or 
international conventions. Furthermore , Judges in many cases refer to the 
human rights as Zaki Abdurrahman J. did in the case of Khalid Mohamed 
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Khier v. S. G.80. This reference means that Judges apply to some extent 
the principles of international human rights law even if there has been no 
complete theory on the position of international human rights law in the 
Sudan .The Judges and lawyers generally would formulate a complete 
and appropriate theory on this issue if many cases are based on the 
ground of international human rights law principles. 
 
3 – The Arguments for and against Empowering Courts to Protect 
Human Rights. 
 
There are many arguments which are relied upon to justify or deny the 
granting of power to national courts to protect human rights. In this 
section we will discuss these arguments in detail. 
 
 
 
(i)  Arguments for Empowering Courts to Protect Human Rights. 
 
The argument for empowering courts to protect human rights is not a case 
against empowering non-judicial governmental institutions and officials 
to protect human rights too, though it is an argument against empowering 
only non-judicial governmental institutions and officials to protect human 
rights. 
 
The principal argument for empowering politically independent courts to 
protect human rights begins with the premise that incumbency is a 
cardinal value (not the only value, but nonetheless a cardinal one) for 
electorally accountable government officials: such officials typically want 
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to preserve their own incumbency and / or the incumbency of as many 
other members of their party as possible. Therefore, such officials want to 
make popular decisions; at a minimum they want to avoid making 
unpopular decisions. But the best optimal resolution of a human rights 
controversy (a controversy about what an indeterminate human rights 
means) may well be unpopular. They also want to make decisions that 
will please their most powerful constituencies; at a minimum they want to 
avoid making decisions that will displease those constituencies. But the 
best resolution of a human rights controversy may well displease some of 
their most powerful constituencies. Moreover, such officials want to be 
identified with high profile issues, issues that concern the well-being of a 
large number of citizens. But a human rights issue may well be low 
profile; it may concern the well-being only of a relatively few, marginal – 
and perhaps marginalized – citizens; indeed; it may concern the well-
being only of non-citizens. Therefore, many articulated human rights are 
not likely to be protected in a democracy unless politically independent 
courts play a significant role in protecting them. The non-judicial, 
electorally accountable branches of government frequently have 
insufficient political and institutional incentive to attend to a claim that 
government has violated, or is violating, articulated human rights. Indeed, 
they sometimes have powerful incentive to ignore or at least to discount 
such a claim. These observations are grounded in the shared historical 
experiences of liberal democracies and are widely endorsed in liberal 
democracies. If you are going to protect people who will never have 
political power, at any rate in the foreseeable future (not only individuals 
but minority groups with their own treasured and properly treasured 
social customs, religion and ways of life), if they are going to be 
protected it will not be done in parliament. They will never muster a 
majority. It's got to be done by the courts and the courts can do it only if 
they have got the proper guidelines. There are ample grounds, based on 
experience in countries with constitutional human rights protection, to 
suggest that entrenchment of bills of rights can contribute significantly to 
the empowerment of  disadvantaged groups, by providing a judicial 
forum in which they can be heard and seek redress, in circumstances 
where the political process could not have been successfully mobilized to 
assist them.81 
 
On the other hand human rights, in the first instance must be enforced 
through domestic courts. The reasons are; firstly while most human rights 
treaties provide for independent supervisory procedures and organs, few 
state perhaps with the exception of the parties to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms have accepted the optional clauses or protocols concerning the 
right of individuals to have recourse before such organs (the American 
system, however, is different). Moreover, even where contracting parties 
have allowed such individual rights, the role of domestic courts remains 
critical, since as a general rule, the route to international remedies 
remains blocked until full exhaustion of domestic remedies has 
occurred.82 
 
As far as common law is concerned, three additional reasons may be 
given for protecting human rights through courts. One is the impartiality 
and competence which is associated with courts functioning in the 
common law tradition. Despite frequent attacks and attempts to denigrate 
the qualities they remain real in the public eye. Public confidence in the 
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judicial system, as demonstrated by surveys, (notwithstanding academic 
and political attacks) surpasses its confidence in political institutions, the 
bureaucracy, the media and academia. This confidence itself encourages 
and promotes the impartiality and dedication of the judiciary. A second 
factor is that unlike political institutions, the common law courts have no 
license to arbitrary action. Judicial discretions unlike political discretions, 
are strictly limited to the application or adjustment of already established 
norms and standards. Thus there are inbuilt restraints in the judicial 
method which ensure a greater degree of certainty and fairness. A third 
factor is that the common law itself is a product of reasoned disputation 
where individual rights and duties are claimed and evaluated. No 
comparable process obtains in the political system in which ideological 
considerations often prevail and aggressive pressure groups exercise 
influence without regard to reason, justice or community values.83 
 
 
(ii) Arguments against Protecting Human Rights through Domestic 
Courts. 
 
The fundamental argument against empowering courts to protect human 
rights, which we may call the argument from democracy, is twofold: It is 
undemocratic for courts to protect human rights... that is, entrenched, 
indeterminate human rights; moreover, it is hostile to the practice of 
democratic deliberation, and therefore subversive of the citizen as a 
community of political-moral judgment, for courts to do so. The serious 
argument is not that it is undemocratic for courts to protect human tights.. 
It is easy to bat that argument away. Democracy is not the same as 
unrestraint majoritarianism. We are talking about liberal democracy, and 
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no democracy is truly liberal if it violates certain human rights. Rather, 
the serious argument is that it is undemocratic for courts to protect human 
rights that, as articulated, are indeterminate. More precisely, the serious 
argument is that it is undemocratic for a court to impose on government 
that courts own judgment about what an indeterminate human right 
forbids- a judgment according to which government is violating the right- 
when according to a different but nonetheless reasonable judgment about 
what the right forbids, government is not violating the right. Democracy 
requires that the reasonable judgment of electorally accountable 
government officials about what an indeterminate human rights forbids, 
trump the competing reasonable judgment of politically independent 
judges. Democracy means government not by judiciary but by electorally 
accountable government officials.84 
 
How is it not only undemocratic, but hostile to the practice of democratic 
deliberation and therefore subversive of the citizen as a community of 
political- moral judgment, for courts to protect human rights? Because by 
imposing on government their own judgments about what indeterminate 
human rights forbid (or require) government to do, politically 
independent courts necessarily discourage citizens and their 
representatives from themselves deliberating about what specification of 
indeterminate human rights norms to adopt, what shape to give the 
norms, in particular context in which the norms are invoked. In a 
democracy, such judgments, like other reasonably contestable political-
moral judgments, should be the yield not of judicial self-assertion but of 
democratic deliberation.85 
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The argument against empowering courts to protect entrenched, 
indeterminate human rights is undeniably strong. But so is the argument 
for doing so: To choose not to empower courts to protect human rights is 
unattractive, because, again, human rights are not likely to be optimally 
protected in a democracy unless politically independent courts are 
empowered to protect them.86 If the citizen of a liberal democracy had to 
choose between (a) giving courts no power to protect (entrenched 
indeterminate) human rights and (b) giving them the kind of power 
exercised by the Supreme Court of the United States, they would be in a 
bind. Choice (a) is extreme; it in effect denies the truth of the case for 
empowering politically independent courts to protect human rights. But 
choice (b) is extreme too- it is at the other extreme from choice (a) - 
because it in effect denies the truth of the case against empowering 
politically independent courts to protect human rights. Happily, (a) and 
(b) are not the only choices; there are other, more moderate choices. 
Choices that accept the truth of the argument for empowering courts to 
protect human rights without denying the truth of the argument from 
democracy.87 
 
4. Judicial Review of Legislation. 
 
The judiciary may play a critical role in defending human rights  through 
the power of judicial review. With the rise of formal constitutions and 
their guarantees of individuals’ rights, there has been an accompanying 
rise in perceived need for some formal mechanism to check whether the 
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laws and rules issued by the legislature conform to the constitution. The 
human rights    protection is nominal if no power is granted to courts to 
enforce human rights by means of constitutional review of rights. In this 
section we will focus on judicial review of legislation only and will not 
discuss the judicial review of administrative acts. The review of 
legislation is more important as far as human rights concerned. In 
addition the size of the research does not allow us to concentrate on both 
of them. 
 
The written constitutions need a final interpreter in most of the countries 
with written constitutions. This role is assigned to the judiciary and the 
judiciary in most of the countries has power to declare any legislation 
void. This role is what is termed judicial review. The doctrine has its 
origin in England but because of the principle of the parliament 
supremacy it does not prevail there at present. 
 
One of the most important functions of the power of judicial review 
generally, is that it largely contributes towards the establishment of the 
constitutionality of the government. It is in fact the main bulwark of 
constitutionalism. 
 
It is a limitation on the government power for the interest of her people. 
The power of judicial review enables an aggrieved party to invoke courts' 
jurisdiction, provided he can establish a locus standi entitling him to 
challenge the administrative or legislative act. The doctrine is also 
significant as it connotes the existence of the rule of law as a part of the 
system of government in a system where the rule of law prevails.88 
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It is comparatively rare for the courts to have jurisdiction to review 
legislation except in federal states, such as Switzerland and the federal 
members of the Commonwealth, where some check is necessary to 
preserve the respective rights of the federation and its competent 
members. The United States of America is the classic example of a 
federation in which each state as well as the federation has a completely 
rigid constitution. Here the state courts have jurisdiction to declare state 
legislation repugnant to the state constitution; and federal courts have 
jurisdiction to declare provisions of state constitutions, state legislation 
and federal legislation repugnant to the Federal Constitution. It is not 
strictly accurate to say that the courts declare legislation void: when cases 
are brought before them judicially, they may declare that an alleged right 
or power does not exist or that an alleged wrong has been committed 
because a certain statute relied on is unconstitutional. Under the influence 
of Chief Justice Marshall the American Supreme Court first assumed the 
power of declaring Federal Legislation unconstitutional in Marbury V. 
Madison.89 
 
John Marshal was Secretary of state in the Adams administration when he 
took office as Chief Justice on January 31, 1803. He continued as Acting 
Secretary of State until the last day of the Adams administration, March 
3, 1801. William Marbury was one of a number of persons who were 
appointed justices of the peace in the District of Columbia and who were 
confirmed by the Senate on March 3. His commission remained in 
Marshall's office undelivered when the new administration took over. 
President Jefferson directed his Secretary of State, James Madison, to 
withhold several commissions, including that of Marbury. Marbury then 
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brought a suit against Madison, taking the unusual step of starting the 
action in the Supreme Court, invoking its original jurisdiction.90 The 
following observations of chief Justice Marshall are pertinent to note; 
"the powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those 
limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is   written. It is 
a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls any 
legislative Act repugnant to it, or that the legislature may alter the 
constitution by an ordinary Act. Between these alternatives there is 
middle ground. The constitution is either a superior paramount law 
unchangeable by ordinary means or it is on a level with ordinary 
legislative Acts, and like other Acts is alterable when the legislator should 
please to alter it. If the former part of the alternative be true, then a 
legislative Act contrary to the constitution is not law. Certainly all those 
who have framed written Constitutions contemplate them as forming the 
fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently, the 
theory of every such government must be that an Act of the Legislature 
contrary to the constitution is void.91 
 
For more than a century after Marbury V. Madison, judicial review of 
legislation was largely an American phenomenon. The Twentieth 
Century, particularly the years following World War 11 has seen an 
explosion of the concept both on the national and international levels. A 
comparison of judicial review in the United States and in Western Europe 
is particularly instructive. Austria, Italy and Germany have specialized 
constitutional courts to determine the constitutional validity of legislation. 
Ordinary courts cannot decide whether laws are constitutional or not, 
although they can refer those questions for decision to the constitutional 
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courts. This system of "centralized" judicial review is often contrasted 
with the "decentralized" system represented by Marbury v. Madison. The 
theory of Marbury requires every court, even the most inferior, to decide 
whether laws are constitutional. 
There are many writers who give different justifications for judicial 
review. Some writers' defense of judicial review derives from the theory 
of limited powers that underlies many political systems. In order to 
maintain the legitimacy of government, some institution must be 
authorized to decide whether or not governmental action transgresses 
constitutional limits. They suggest that an independent, precedent-
respecting, learned tribunal could best carry out this function. Not 
surprisingly, they view the Supreme Court as such an institution. Others 
argue that, due to the counter-majoritarian nature of judicial review, the 
practice can be justified only if it serves a function distinctive from 
legislative and executive activities that are consistent with the basic 
democratic principles upon which the system of government in the United 
States is based.92 
 
There are two sorts of judicial review; interpretive review and non-
interpretive review. The legitimacy of non-interpretive review is the 
central problem of cotemporary constitutional theory. The distinction 
between interpretive and non-interpretive review can best be elaborated in 
terms of a particular conception of the United States Constitution. The 
Constitution consists of a complex of value judgments the Framers wrote 
into the text of the Constitution and thereby contitutionalized. Such 
important judgments fall into two categories. One category defines the 
structure of American government by specifying the division of authority, 
first, between the federal government and the government of the states 
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and, second, among the three branches of the federal government – 
legislative, executive, and judicial. The other category defines the limits 
of governmental authority vis-à-vis the individual; this category of value 
judgment specifies certain aspects of the relationship that shall exist 
between the individual and government. The Supreme Court engages in 
interpretive review when it ascertains, the constitutionality of a given 
policy choice by reference to one of the value judgments embodied, 
though not necessarily explicitly, either in some particular provision of 
the text of the constitution or in the overall structure of government 
ordained by the constitution. Such review is "interpretive" because the 
court reaches its decision by interpreting the textual provision or the 
aspect of the governmental structure that embodies the determinative 
value judgment. Interpretive review is a hermeneutical enterprise; the 
effort is to ascertain, as accurately as available historical materials will 
permit, the character of a value judgment the Framers constitutionalized 
at some point in the past. The court engages in non-interpretative review 
when it makes the determination of constitutionality by reference to a 
value judgment other than the one constitutionalized by the Framers. 
Such review is "non-interpretive" because the court reaches its decision 
without really interpreting, in the hermeneutical sense, any provision of 
the constitutional text (or any aspect of government structure). Although, 
to be sure, the court may explain its decision with rhetoric designed to 
create the illusion that it is merely "interpreting" or "applying" some 
constitutional provision.93 
 
"Interpretivism" refers to constitutional theory that claims that only 
interpretive judicial review is legitimate and, in particular, that all non-
interpretive review is illegitimate. Non-interpretivism describes 
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constitutional theory that claims that at least some non-interpretive review 
– non-interpretive review with respect to at least some categories of 
constitutional questions, with the categories specified by the interpretivist 
theory in question-is also legitimate. 
 
In adjudicating a person's claim that government has violated his human 
rights when no value judgment constitutionalized by the Framers is 
determinative, the court in effect submits the challenged governmental 
action to a moral critique. In striking down such action, the court assumes 
a prophetic stance, opposing itself to established conventions. But that 
does not end the matter. The relationship between non-interpretive review 
and electorally accountable policymaking is dialectical. The electorally 
accountable political processes generate a policy choice that typically 
reflects some fairly well established moral conventions. In exercising 
non-interpretive review, the court evaluates that choice on political-moral 
grounds, in the end either accepting or rejecting it. If the Court rejects a 
given policy choice,  the political processes must respond, whether by 
embracing the court's decision, by tolerating it, or, if the decision is not 
accepted or is not accepted fully, by moderating or even by undoing it.94 
 
As far as Sudan is concerned, judicial review can effectively be used to 
protect human rights. The Transitional Constitutional of 1964 granted the 
power of judicial review to the High Court. Article 8 stated that 
constitutional remedy in respect of any of the rights conferred by Chapter 
11 of that Constitution was vested in the High Court. Article 99 provided 
that “the Judiciary shall be the custodian of the Constitution, and shall 
have jurisdiction to hear and determine any matter involving the 
interpretation of the rights and freedoms conferred by Chapter 11”. The 
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two articles 8 and 99 vested in the High Court the power of judicial 
review over legislative and executive authorities in the Sudan, so that 
they could not exceed the boundaries and limitations prescribed by the 
constitution. This is the same principle applied in India and the United 
States of America in contrast with the United Kingdom where parliament 
is supreme and its legislation is not subject to judicial review.95 
 
The Supreme Court of the Sudan has explained in the case of Nasr 
Abdurrahman V. The Legislative Authority, 96 that although the courts are 
bound to apply what the legislature enacts as law, they are bound, in the 
first place, to observe and apply the provisions of the constitution. 
Consequently, should the law be inconsistent with the constitutional 
provisions, the courts must refrain from applying that law. If the dispute 
is laid before the Supreme Court, it is bound to declare such law 
unconstitutional, and as such it should not be applied. This is because the 
constitution which emanates from the people is distinguished from 
ordinary legislation. Its peculiar features cast upon it the quality of 
supremacy and reference, and dictate that  it shall prevail over legislation 
not only enacted after the constitution was promulgated, but also over 
pre-existing enactments, if they are still in force and contrary to the 
provisions of the constitution. 
 
It is apparent now that our Supreme Court has been exercising review 
over legislation to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by the constitution. But the Constitution of 1998 grants the 
powers to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms to the 
Constitutional Court established by the provisions of that Constitution. It 
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states that the Constitutional Court is the custodian of the constitution, 
and has jurisdiction to consider and adjudge any matter relating, inter alia 
to claims by the aggrieved for the protection of freedoms, sanctities or 
rights guaranteed by the Constitution.97 Thus the judicial review of 
legislation is vested in the newly established Constitutional Court. 
  
The protection of human rights through judicial review of legislation 
exists in countries where there are written constitutions such as the 
United States of America. In states that do not have written constitutions, 
ordinary courts use ordinary laws to protect human rights. A good 
example for this system of protection is the United Kingdom which has in 
1998 passed a specific human rights Act to be applied by the ordinary 
courts in addition to other Acts which protect human rights. 
 
The most significant laws that can be used by the courts in the absence or 
presence of constitution are the criminal law and criminal procedure law. 
In criminal codes of many countries the well known principle in the 
criminal law nulum crimen and nula poena sine lege has been 
strengthened. This principle enables the protection of human rights and at 
the same time decreases arbitrariness amongst state bodies. The special 
part of the criminal codes of many countries provide for legal and 
criminal protection for a large number of human rights. The most 
important human rights enjoying such protection are: the right to life and 
bodily integrity, fundamental rights and freedoms, honor and prestige, 
dignity of the personality, marriage and family and the health of people.98 
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The courts in the Sudan can use the criminal codes to protect human 
rights as well as the power of judicial review. 
 
5. The Protection of Human Rights in Other Countries (decided 
cases). 
 
Courts in different parts of the world play their role in protecting human 
rights. The judgments those courts grant to victims and rules they lay 
down can be considered as guidelines for courts in countries where 
process of protecting of human rights through domestic courts is still in 
infancy. 
 
Litigation involving property rights issues as one of the most important 
human rights has been a frequent feature in the American legal system. 
United States Supreme Court plays a central role in defining the 
parameters of this evolving constitutional concept. The American 
Supreme Court, for instance, has found several categories of cases where 
the government's obligation to compensate exists.99 
 
The U.S Supreme Court had in 1954 discussed one of the most important 
human rights cases in the history of the United States of America; that is 
the case of Brown v. Board of Education.100 In that case African- 
American community leaders took action against the segregation in 
America's schools. Aided by the local chapter of the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), a group of thirteen 
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parents filed a class action suit against the Board of Education of Topek 
Schools on May 17, 1954. The Supreme Court ruled in a unanimous 
decision that the "separate but equal" clause was unconstitutional because 
it violated the children's 14th Amendment rights by separating them 
solely on the classification of the color of their skin. Chief Justice Warren 
delivered the Court's opinion, stating that "segregated schools are not 
equal and cannot be made equal, and hence they are deprived of the equal 
protection of the laws". This ruling in favor of integration was one of the 
most significant strides America has taken in favour of civil liberties. 
 
The decision brought an end to the legal doctrine of “separate but equal" 
enshrined by the same court nearly sixty years earlier in Plessy v. 
Ferguson.101 In Plessy, the Supreme Court held that segregation was 
acceptable if the separate facilities provided for blacks were equal to 
those provided for whites. 
 
Courts in Canada also have been playing a significant role in protecting 
human rights, for instance, in Eldridge V. British Columbia.102 The 
appellant sought a declaration that the failure to provide sign language 
interpreters as an insured benefit under the Medical Service Plan violates 
their right to the equal protection and equal benefit of law without 
discrimination (S.15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms). 
The Supreme Court of Canada found that the failure to provide sign 
language interpretation to deaf patients in medical institutions deprived 
them of their ability to "benefit equally from services offered to general 
public". When the government sought to justify this failure on the basis 
that it had insufficient resources, the court confirmed the long standing 
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position in Canadian constitutional rights jurisprudence that “financial 
consideration alone may not justify Charter infringements". 
 
In India, starvation deaths had occurred in Rajasthan despite excess grain 
being kept for official times of famine. Various schemes throughout India 
for food distribution were also not functioning. In 2001, the Peoples 
Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) petitioned the court for enforcement of 
the Schemes and the Famine Code. The PUCL based their arguments on 
the right to food, deriving it from the right to life. The court, noting the 
right to life, stated "Would the very existence of life of those families 
which are below the poverty line not come under danger for want of 
appropriate schemes and implementation".  They found systematic failure 
by the government to implement and resource various food schemes. The 
court ordered that: (a) The Famine Code be implemented for three 
months: (b) Grain allocation for the food for work scheme be doubled 
from 5 to 10 million tons and increased financial support for schemes; (c) 
Ration shop Licensees must stay open and provide the grain to families 
below the poverty line (BPL) at the set price; (d) The government 
publicize the right of BPL families to grain to ensure all eligible families 
are covered; (a) All individuals without means of support (older persons, 
widows, disabled adults) be granted an Antyodaya Anna Yozanaration 
card for free grain; (f) state governments progressively implement the 
mid Day Meal Scheme in schools.103 
 
Since India is a country whose economic and social circumstances are 
similar to Sudan’s, these judgments can be copied and applied in our 
courts to fight famine. Human rights are human rights everywhere. 
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 A second case relating to the protection of human rights in Indian 
Supreme Court is Olga Tellis. V. Bombay Municipality Corporation.104 In 
this case, the state of Maharashtra and the Bombay Municipal Council in 
1981 moved to evict all pavement and slum dwellers from Bombay city. 
The pavement dwellers claimed this was a violation of their right to 
livelihood, which is comprehended in the right, guaranteed by Article 21 
of the constitution that no person shall be deprived of his life except 
according to procedure established by law. The court held that the 
constitutionally enshrined right to life encompasses the right to 
livelihood. This is supported by constitutional directive principles 
concerning adequate means of livelihood and work. It was held that the 
authorities’ action amounted to a deprivation of the citizens’ right to 
livelihood as they required housing for their livelihood in order to secure 
their right to life. But the court also held that deprivation of the right to 
livelihood could occur if there was a just and fair procedure undertaken 
according to law. The action must be reasonable and persons affected 
must be afforded an opportunity of being heard. The court found that this 
condition was satisfied by the Supreme Court proceedings. 
 
Different cases relating to human rights were brought before the 
Philippines Supreme Court by victims claiming protection of their rights. 
A good example is the case of Oposa vs. Secretary of the Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources.105 In that case an action was filed by 
several minors represented by their parents against the Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources to cancel existing timber license 
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agreements in the country and to stop issuance of new ones. It was 
claimed that the resultant deforestation and damage to the environment 
violated their constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and 
to health. The petitioners asserted that they represent others of their 
generation as well as generations yet unborn. The court stated that the 
petitioners were able to file a class suit both for others of their generation 
and for succeeding generations as "the minors’ assertion of their right to a 
sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their 
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to 
come". 
 
Housing rights, land rights, and positive obligations were actually 
protected in South Africa in Grootboom V. Oostenberg Municipality et. 
al106 in which 900 persons were evicted and they settled on a sport field. 
Community approached the court on the basis of their constitutional right 
to have access to adequate housing. The court held that the constitution 
does not oblige the state to go beyond its available resources or to realize 
the socio-economic rights contained in the constitution immediately. 
However, the state must give effect to these rights and, in appropriate 
circumstances, the courts can and must enforce these obligations. The 
court held that the question to be considered by the court is whether the 
measures taken by the state to realize socio-economic rights under the 
constitution are reasonable. Those whose needs are the most urgent and 
whose ability to enjoy all rights is most in peril must not be ignored. If 
the measures, though statistically successful, fail to make provision for 
responding to the needs of those most desperate, they may not pass the 
test of reasonableness. The court held that, although the measures in this 
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case had been statistically successful, the failure of the state housing 
programme to provide any form of temporary relief to those in desperate 
need, with no roof over their heads, or living in crisis conditions meant 
that the programme was not reasonable and failed to satisfy the state's 
obligation to achieve the progressive realization of these rights. The court 
issued a declaratory order,107 that required the state to devise and 
implement a programme that included measures to provide relief for 
those desperate who had not been catered for in the State. 
 
In Sudan, courts have been dealing with cases involving human rights 
with fear. They have been trying to avoid the discussion of any such 
cases. Such fear normally prevents the judiciary from being involved in 
political problems and issues and this is all good and well, but the 
downside is that citizens may not be satisfied with the judiciary's ability 
to protect their rights and fundamental freedoms. This trend appeared for 
the first time in the case of Building Authority of Khartoum V. 
Evangellos Evangellides108 where the majority of the Appeal Court 
members insisted that constitutional issues cannot be discussed in the 
case unless they are applied in a separate application and this was the 
decision in Nasr Eldin Elsayed Leadings case.109 This was the position 
until November 1958. The period from 1964 – 1969 witnessed some 
developments in the field of human rights protection. One of the most 
important cases decided at that time is Joseph Garang’s110 case relating to 
the disbanding of communist party. The decision in that case was based 
on the fact that the Transitional Constitution as amended 1964 did not 
contain machinery for constitutional amendment. Therefore, any 
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amendment is unconstitutional. The case emphasized fundamental 
freedoms and rights and stated that fundamental human rights are natural 
rights which came into being before the existence of man-made 
constitutions. The most important case in our history as to the protection 
of human rights is Mahmoud Mohammed Taha’s case. The decision in 
that case did not overrule a decision which was against natural principles 
of justice only but had opened and paved the way for bringing more 
constitutional actions for protecting human rights.111 
 
It is apparent that the protection of human  rights in Sudan is not 
effective. The cases are so few and no deeply opened discussion was 
made on the issues relating to these rights, whereas cases we mentioned 
from other experiences show us how deeply and hotly the judges make 
their arguments not on civil and political rights only but on economic, 
social and cultural rights as well. 
 
6. Remedies for Human Rights Violations. 
 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights puts 
all states parties to it under an obligation to ensure that victims of human 
rights violations shall have an effective remedy even if those violations 
have been committed by persons acting in official capacity. Remedies 
relating to human rights may either be social and political or judicial. 
Since we are discussing the protection of human rights through national 
courts, only judicial remedies will be illustrated here. 
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The violations may be committed by the state, an individual, or a group 
of persons. Where the state is liable for the violation of human rights, 
remedies range from the relatively non-intrusive declaratory judgment to 
damages to injections and affirmative orders. Many courts have fashioned 
innovative remedies in order to ensure that the public interest in the rule 
of law is fulfilled, as well as to provide redress to the individual whose 
rights were violated. The following are the remedies which can be 
granted by any national court. 
 
(i) Declaratory Judgment. 
 
Courts generally have the right to declare rights, status and other legal 
relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. A 
declaratory judgment is the broad form of non-coercive remedy for 
resolving uncertainty in legal relations. It merely pronounces particular 
practices or conditions to be illegal, leaving officials free to choose 
whether and how to remedy the situation. As such, it is normally used as 
an anticipatory device to obtain a judgment before harm has occurred, 
when it is immediately threatened.112 
 
(ii) Compensation. 
 
States uniformally use money to reimburse out-of-pocket expenses and to 
compensate for provable future direct and indirect losses resulting from 
the injury. Many states compensate also for pain and suffering resulting 
from physical injury, under the heading “pecuniary harm”. Other states 
consider pain and suffering as part of intangible losses, compensated by 
moral damages. Compensable injury includes the same basic elements in 
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virtually all legal systems: medical and other expenses; loss of or injury 
to property, including lost profits; pain and suffering and injury to health; 
funeral expenses in wrongful death case and loss of the services of a 
deceased.113 
 
National legal systems vary in the methods used to assess the recoverable 
elements and the amount awarded. This is not surprising given the 
differing economic conditions around the world and the differing weight 
given to the compensatory and deterrent functions of damages.114 
 
(iii) Punitive or Exemplary Damages. 
 
Punitive or exemplary damages are neither new nor limited to a few 
countries, but instead are found in legal systems throughout the world. 
According to some authors, the very antiquity of such a remedy is 
something of a prima facie case for its usefulness. In most common law 
courtiers, punitive or exemplary damages may be awarded in cases of 
egregious wrongdoing. They are, as their names imply, damages by way 
of punishment or deterrence, given entirely without reference to any 
proved actual loss suffered by the plaintiff. The courts of various 
countries enhance damages for egregious government misconduct. In 
some legal systems, punitive damages can be awarded against individual 
officials for flagrantly wrongful acts, but government entities cannot be 
subject to such awards on the grounds that punitive damages would 
punish tax-payers who took no part in the misconduct. It is also posited 
that the deterrent function served by punitive damages is less necessary in 
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the case of a government entity, because the government is likely to 
sanction an offending official even without the award.115 
  
(iv) Non-monetary Remedies. 
 
Money as a substitute for the exercise of guaranteed human rights is 
particularly problematic, leading many victims and their representatives 
to seek other remedies. Many legal systems allow courts to issue specific 
orders of restitution or other acts by the wrongdoer to repair the harm 
caused. Other forms of non-monetary remedies include acts of 
rehabilitation, punishment of the wrongdoers, and restitution of right or 
property.116 
 
(v) Habeas Corpus and Amparo. 
 
The writ of habeas corpus has its origin in English law, being mentioned 
in the Magna Carta. The writ of habeas corpus protects individuals 
against arbitrary and wrongful imprisonment or confinement. It has been 
viewed as the great writ of liberty. A common law right to habeas corpus 
exists in many states, in others it is provided by statute or constitutional 
provision. Many Latin American countries recognize amparo, a broader 
remedy than habeas corpus. It is a procedure whereby individuals who are 
deprived of or threatened with deprivation of constitutional right may 
seek redress from the Judiciary. Habeas corpus and amparo are 
particularly important remedies when evidence is in the hands of the 
state.117 
(vi) Attorney’s Fees and Costs. 
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 There is considerable difference in the treatment of fees and costs from 
one country to another. The English rule is that the prevailing parties 
recover fees as a matter of course from the losing party. This is followed 
in most common law countries including Sudan and   in Western Europe. 
The rule in the USA is that each side pays its own costs and fees unless 
the court is authorized by statute or recognized equitable exception to 
shift payment of the fees to the opposing party. Japan follows the same 
rule as the USA. Two reasons are given for not awarding fees and costs to 
the prevailing party. First, fee - shifting could discourage the poor from 
bringing law suits out of fear of having to pay the other side’s fees. 
Secondly, and probably more important, fee-shifting would impose too 
great a burden on judicial administration due to the inherent difficulty in 
computing fees. Unfortunately, the vast majority of human rights cases 
are brought by the poor, who cannot afford legal counsel to challenge 
wrongdoing. As a result, even where attorney’s fees and costs normally 
are not awarded for private litigation, domestic law often allows their 
recovery in public interest cases such as human rights. In federal civil 
rights litigation in the USA, the law allows reasonable attorney’s fees to 
ensure effective access to the judicial process for those seeking 
vindication of civil rights.118 
  
7- Developing New and more Effective Remedies for Socio - economic 
Rights. 
 
Some writers on human rights emphasize that the litigation around socio -
economic rights often presents features which call for the development 
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and creation of new and more effective remedies. 119Two suggestions to 
the development of the remedies of damages and mandamus can be stated 
here. 
 
 
 
 
(i) Preventative Damages. 
 
The preventative damages can play a good role in remedying victims. A 
remedy such as compensatory damages directed only at the discrete 
violations of the past does not address the threat of existing and on going 
violations posed by a delinquent state institution. Preventative damages, 
on the other hand, recognize and address the existing threat and seek to 
remove it from society to prevent tomorrow violations rather than merely 
to give solace to their victims.120 
 
(ii) Reparation in kind. 
 
A conventional award of damages in delict seeks to compensate the 
victim in cash for the injury inflicted on his person or his property. Such 
an award may often be inappropriate to compensate the victims of past 
violations of socio-economic rights because the harm done by the 
violation may be too diffuse or amorphous. How does one, for instance, 
compensate the victims of unfair race-discrimination in the provision of 
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education, pervasive throughout a town, region or province over a long 
period of time? One way of addressing the problem would be to order the 
state to provide appropriate remedial services for the benefit of the 
victimized class as a whole, rather than to resort to individualized   
awards of damages in cash.121  
 
These two suggestions and others are, in actuality, an attempt to find 
more deeply rooted solutions to the problem of human rights violations 
by extending the effect of remedies to the whole society and to the 
existing as well as to tomorrow violations. 
 
8-Conclusions 
 
The protection of fundamental rights and freedoms through national 
courts is not entirely new. The courts all over the world and throughout 
the history were originally established to protect the rights of individuals. 
What is new is the protection of these rights in the modern concept The 
courts can, in actuality, achieve this highly important task effectively by 
exercising judicial review over all legislations in the state. By having that 
power, courts are in a prophetic stance which enables them to distinguish 
the good legislation from the bad one basing their decision on the human 
rights doctrine. The incorporation of international human rights law into 
domestic law plays an additional role in this field. The courts can also 
achieve their role by using the ordinary laws such as criminal law and 
criminal procedure law which are strongly connected to human rights 
protection. This method is normally used in countries which do not have 
written constitutions. The Judicial review is, however, the main weapon 
in the hands of the judges to be used for the purposes of rights protection 
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process and in the process of preventing the occurrence of human rights 
violations. 
 
In short, the courts play the most important role in the protection of 
human rights by using different methods. The most significant one is the 
judicial review. It should be noted that perfect protection of human rights 
cannot be achieved unless there is a real democratic system, a system 
which has a strong conviction and creed that human rights should be 
protected. A political system that has this conviction will take all 
necessary steps and measures to realize the principles of a democratic 
system in which promotion and protection of human rights occupies a 
central position.                          
  
           
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
The Role of National Human Rights Institutions  
 
1. Introduction. 
 
Human Rights and fundamental freedoms are protected through national 
courts as well as through national human rights institutions. This chapter 
will clarify the definition of these institutions, a short historical 
background in the light of the role of the United Nations in the field of 
national institutions, the types of the national human rights institutions, 
namely, human rights commissions and ombudspersons, and finally it 
will state the differences between these institutions and NGOs. 
 
2. Definition of National Human Rights Institutions.  
   
It is appropriate first of all to define the term "national human rights 
institutions" (NHRIs). Despite the existence of comprehensive standards 
relating to practice and functions, an analysis of activities conducted both 
within and outside the United Nations system reveals that there is not yet 
an agreed definition of the term “national human rights institutions”. The 
conceptual framework for early United Nations activities in the area was 
flexible enough to include virtually any institution at the national level 
having a direct and indirect impact on the promotion and protection of 
human rights. Accordingly, the judiciary, administrative tribunals, 
legislative organs, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), legal aid 
offices and social welfare schemes were given equal attention, along with 
national commissions, ombudsman offices and related structures. This 
broad formulation, however, has been gradually pared down by the 
subsequent work of the United Nations on the subject to the point where a 
more narrow group of institutions has emerged, on the basis of particular 
common functions, including: educational and promotional activities, the 
provisions of advice to government on human rights matters; and the 
investigation and resolution of complaints of violations committed by 
public (and occasionally also private) entities. However, while operating 
to exclude previously included institutions such as judiciary, the 
legislature and social welfare structures, this functional approach to 
categorization has not yet resulted in an ultimate definition of what 
constitutes a national institution for the promotion and protection of 
human rights. The Paris Principles (1991) relating to the status of national 
institutions represent an important step in the evolutionary process. The 
principles attempt to clarify the concept of a “national institution” by 
providing standards on the status and advisory role of national human 
rights commissions. If these standards are applied to the general class of 
national institutions, not only those designated as “commissions”, then a 
national institution must be a body established in the constitution or by 
law to perform particular functions in the field of human rights. This 
process will then operate to exclude only governmental instrumentalities 
with more general functions (such as administrative tribunals), but also 
all organizations not founded in law. Despite these refinements, it is 
evident that the concept of national institution is not yet fully evolved. At 
the same time, the practical utility of establishing boundaries, however 
flexible, has been recognized. For the purpose of United Nations 
activities in this field, therefore, the term "national institution" is taken to 
refer to a body which is established by a government under the 
constitution, or by law or decree, the functions of which are especially 
defined in terms of the promotion and protection of human rights.122  
      
Accordingly, a National Human Rights institution can be defined as an 
independent organization that is established by the government, according 
to specific legislation, on the organization, in order to promote and 
protect human rights at the national level.123 Within this meaning many 
countries have set up NHRIs, including inter alia, Australia, Canada, 
Denmark, France, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Jordan, Mauritius, 
Nepal, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, New Zealand, Norway, Palestine, 
South Africa, Uganda, The Ukraine, and Sudan.  
   
3. The Role of the United Nations in the field of National Institutions. 
 
The question of national human rights institutions was first raised and 
discussed by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 1946, two 
years before the General Assembly proclaimed the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights as "a common standard of achievement for all peoples 
and nations". At its second session, in 1946, ECOSOC invited member 
states to consider the desirability of establishing information groups or 
local human rights committees within their respective countries to 
collaborate with them in furthering the work of the commission on human 
rights. Fourteen years later the matter was raised again, in a resolution 
which recognized the important role national institutions could play in the 
promotion and protection of human rights, and which invited 
Governments to encourage the formation and continuation of such bodies 
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as well as to communicate all relevant information on the subject to the 
Secretary-General. 
 
As standard-setting in the field of human rights gained momentum during 
the 1960s and 1970s, discussion on national institutions became 
increasingly focused on the ways in which such bodies could assist in the 
effective implementation of these international standards. In 1978, the 
Commission on Human Rights decided to organize a seminar in order, 
inter alia, to draft guidelines for the structure and functioning of national 
institutions. Accordingly, the seminar on National and Local Institutions 
for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights was held in Geneva in 
September 1978 and approved a set of guidelines. 
  
Throughout the 1980s, the United Nations continued to take an active 
interest in this topic and a series of reports prepared by the Secretary-
General were presented to the General Assembly. It was during this time 
that a considerable number of national institutions were established, many 
with the support of the United Nations Centre for Human Rights. In 1990, 
the Commission on Human Rights called for a workshop to be convened 
with the participation of national and regional institutions involved in the 
promotion and protection of human rights. The workshop was to review 
patterns of cooperation between national institutions and international 
organizations, such as the United Nations and its agencies, and to explore 
ways of increasing the effectiveness of national institutions. Accordingly, 
the first international Workshop on National Institutions for the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights was held in Paris from 7 to 9 
October 1991. Its conclusions were indorsed by the Commission on 
Human Rights in resolution 1992/54 as the principles relating to the 
status of national institutions (the "Paris Principles") and subsequently by 
the General Assembly in resolution 431134 of 20 December 1993. The 
principles affirm that national institutions are to be vested with 
competence to promote and protect human rights and given as broad a 
mandate as possible, set forth clearly in a constitutional or legislative 
text.124 
       
4. Types of National Human Rights Institutions. 
 
As we have found out from the definition of NHRIs at the outset of this 
chapter the concept of NHRI should not be confused with other entities 
acting at the national level with a human rights mandate. Such as the 
judiciary, administrative tribunals, legislative organs or NGOs. The work 
of the UN in the field of NHRIs makes clear the difference between 
NHRIs and other similar institutions. The Paris Principles, in particular, 
have intended to provide a specific technical meaning to the NHRIs. For 
the purpose of this chapter, a NHRI is a domestic organization that has 
the following five elements; is established by state; acts in accordance 
with the constitution or other legislation; is independent; provides 
advisory opinions; has a mandate to promote and protect human rights. 
Therefore, NHRIs are administrative or "quasi-judicial entities", with 
neither judicial nor lawmaking capacities. With this in mind the majority 
of NHRIs might be identified as belonging to one of two broad 
categories; "human rights commissions" and "ombudsman". Furthermore, 
there is a third type referred to as specialized institutions. The first type 
i.e. national human rights commissions have a general mandate to 
perform all of the NHRIs functions, while the second have a specific 
mandate to oversee fairness and legality in area of public administration, 
to receive complaints from individuals or groups, to investigate alleged 
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human rights violations and to act as a mediator between individuals and 
the government. Nonetheless, the two types of NHRIs are capable of 
performing some similar functions. It is possible to find commissions 
with general mandates,125 or with specific area of specialization that 
concern certain groups, which might differ from one country to another, 
such as racial discrimination, political rights, children, women, disabled 
persons, refugees or indigenous peoples.126 Likewise, the ombudsmen 
could have a general mandate to investigate and receive complaints, or to 
be specialized in specific matters or groups.127 Also most of the 
commissions have, inter alia, an ombudsman mandate, and some 
ombudsmen have educative, information, or legislative review functions 
which are quite similar to the work of commissions.128 Thus there are no 
definitive forms of NHRIs, and each state is free to choose the NHRI 
framework which best suits its needs. 
  
The different forms of national human rights institutions play different 
roles in promoting and protecting human rights. In order to illustrate these 
different roles let us shade the light on two of the three main types of 
NHRIs. 
  
(i) National Human Rights Commissions. 
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Creating human rights commissions has become a fashionable endeavor 
for many of the world’s governments. Over the past twenty years national 
human rights commissions have sprung up across the globe and are now 
an intrinsic part of the institutional landscape. Encouraged by 
international actors and pressed forward by domestic ones, countries with 
varying social and political backgrounds have moved to set up these 
institutions. 
 
A national human rights commission is a state sponsored and state-funded 
entity that enjoys (or is supposed to enjoy) considerable autonomy. The 
first human rights commission was set up in Canada in 1947, and in some 
other parts of the world the institution of the ombudsman has been vested 
with a human rights jurisdiction. Human rights commissions have 
emerged as the international community has recognized that reactive 
strategies alone are not sufficient to adequately protect human rights. 
While human rights monitoring and litigation have an impact in some 
cases, lack of human rights protection is related to a lack of capacity 
within government. Governmental institutions in some cases may be 
unaware of the human rights implications of their actions and policies. In 
other cases they may lack the knowledge and skills to be able to address 
human rights concerns. Human rights commissions, because of their 
location within government, have the potential to build this human rights 
capacity within other governmental structures.129 The national human 
rights commissions cannot at all play this rule unless they are established 
and composed in a certain way and granted powers that enable them to 
carry out their functions perfectly. In order to illustrate this let us shade 
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light on our newly established National Human Rights Commission and 
some human rights commissions of other nations.  
  
(a) National Human Rights Commission in Sudan. 
 
The National Assembly of Sudan passed on 2 May 2004 the Human 
Rights Commission Act which establishes an independent National 
Human Rights Commission.130 The Commission of course will be closely 
linked to the state, but there are protective safeguards in the law which 
are expected to allow it to act with a fair degree of independence. These 
protective safeguards in different parts of the Act should prevent the state 
from interfering with most functions of the Commission. Section 13 
states that the Chairperson of the Commission’s Council will head the 
meetings of the Commission’s Council, represent the Commission, and 
appoint the officials of the general secretariat of the Commission. This 
safeguard exists in the laws of many nations.131 The NHRC Act of Sudan 
provides generally that the Commission is independent in carrying out its 
work and functions and that no body is permitted to influence it neither 
through inducement nor through terrorizing.132 The Commission will 
have full control over its finances. Section 20 of the Act provides for the 
allocation of an adequate budget for the Commission. This budget should 
be prepared annually by the Commission and be submitted to the 
National Assembly directly to ratify or approve it and include it in the 
general budget of the state. In some countries such as Thailand such 
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budget is submitted through the speaker of the National Assembly to the 
cabinet for consideration and inclusion in an appropriations bill.133 
   
Independence through the appointment process, as we mentioned, is one 
of the means which the Act provides for. The Act does not precisely 
define the qualifications of potential commissioners and disqualify 
individuals who may be corrupt or have a conflict of interest, although it 
generally requires the same conditions of the National Assembly member 
to be satisfied by a commissioner.134 It also states that the commissioner 
must have experience in the field of human rights for not less than five 
years. The Thai Act is much clearer in this point. It sets out a list of 
qualifications and prohibitions, most of which are aimed at preventing 
individuals who are not independent-minded from being appointed. For 
example, persons who have been removed from their jobs because of 
corruption and politicians and members of political parties are 
disqualified.135 
  
In many countries election is the best method for determining members of 
the national commissions. An Act which contains such a provision 
safeguards a highly democratic appointment process which in turn 
strengthens the independence of the commission. The Sudan National 
Commission Act contains an article which states that the members of the 
Commission’s Council will be determined through election. This is good 
and well, but the downside of the article is that it enables the government 
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to appoint all or some of the 27 members of the Council of the 
Commission.136 
 
The independence of the national commission can be                   
guaranteed also through the composition of the commission. The 
Sudanese Act states that the Council of the Commission will be 
composed in a way that ensures the commissioners are reasonably 
representative of society. This will play an important role in safeguarding 
the independence of the commission. According to the Act the 
Commission should be from the following circles: six advisor members to 
represent governmental bodies concerned with human rights, they will be 
determined by the Council of Ministers, 21 selected members to equally 
represent: nongovernmental national organizations and social and 
professional civil society organizations concerned with human rights and 
registered in accordance with the law; university academic staff and 
experts specialized in the field of human rights; national assembly; and 
finally women organizations and associations. The third of the selected 
members will be selected by the National Assembly of its members who 
care for human rights.137 The members of the National Assembly are 
normally representatives of political parties. It would have been better if 
the selected members-from the National Assembly to work in the 
National Commission- had been required not to be members in any of the 
political parties. Persons who are politicians or members of political 
parties should be disqualified to be members of the National 
Commission. 
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In addition to these safeguards, the Act clearly defines the Commission's 
areas of jurisdiction. According to section 4 of the Act the Commission 
will generally work to promote and protect human rights, monitor and 
raise the awareness of the public on human rights. The section states that 
the Commission will in particular work as a source of information for the 
government and the public in the field of human rights, assist in raising 
and promoting the awareness of culture of human rights; assist in 
preparing and implementing research programmes and education of 
human rights; discuss and study any matter concerning human rights 
referred to it by the government and give recommendations on it; advise 
the government with regard to any matter concerning human rights 
referred to it by the government; examine any legislation, decision and 
arrangement that concern human rights and prepare reports on them to the 
concerned authorities or bodies; submit recommendations, proposals and 
decisions to the government, the national assembly, or any other 
concerned authority with regard to any matter of human rights including 
the request to revise legislative and administrative provisions and any 
violations of human rights. In order to achieve these, the Commission has 
a right to receive complaints from individuals and bodies and recommend 
or propose appropriate remedial measures.  
 
The Commission also has a duty to undertake any other task with regard 
to the government obligations under international human rights 
instruments to which Sudan is a party and the government sees it fit to be 
of the Commission’s function: to encourage the state to ratify the 
international instruments relating to human rights; to encourage the 
harmonization of national legislation, regulations and practices with the 
international human rights norms; to publicize awareness of the different 
sectors of Sudanese people on human rights and efforts done to combat 
all forms of discrimination, through advertisement, education, and 
available mass media; and to contribute to the reports which states are 
required to submit. According to Paris Principles such reports should be 
submitted to the United Nations bodies and committees and to regional 
institutions, pursuant to their treaty obligations. 
 
 Another group of duties that the Act puts on the newly born institution is 
to assist in formulation of programmes for the teaching of, and research 
into, human rights and to take part in their execution in schools, 
universities and professional circles; to cooperate with the United Nations 
and any other organizations in the United Nations system, the regional 
institutions, human rights centers and similar national nongovernmental 
institutions that are competent in the areas of the promotion and 
protection of human rights. The Commission should, in addition, conduct 
consultations with other bodies responsible for promotion and protection 
of human rights or which have connection to the promotion and 
protection of human rights within or out of Sudan. In this respect the 
Commission must create strong working relations with Employees Justice 
Chamber and Public Grievances and Corrections Board. 
 
 The final function that the Commission must carry out is to cooperate 
with national nongovernmental organizations devoted to promoting and 
protecting of human rights, to economic and social development, 
combating of racism and to protecting vulnerable groups. 
 
In order to realize these functions the National Commission has power to 
establish appropriate bodies to guarantee the smooth implementation of 
its activities. It can establish committees and working groups and appoint 
a human rights officer or any body or person temporarily or permanently 
to assist it in discharging its task, it can appoint a human rights officer for 
inquiry and investigation or to assist it in preparing reports. The National 
Commission also has power to demand statements, information and 
documents and require the attendance of witnesses for hearing. In 
performing this task, the National Commission has been granted powers 
of inquiry commissions as stated in Commissions of Inquiry Act 1954 
except the power to arrest; power to freely consider any matters falling 
within its competence, whether they are submitted by the government or 
taken up by it without referral to a higher authority on the proposal of its 
members or any petitioner; power to address public opinion directly or 
through any press organ particularly in order to publicize its opinions and 
recommendations; and finally power to refer any person who refuses to 
do any thing demanded by the Commission according to its Act to the 
Attorney General on the ground of contravening the Commission of 
Inquiry Act 1954.138 
 
The functions and powers which are stated in the Act of National Human 
Rights Commission are declared in Paris Principles. These principles set 
out the powers that NHRIs (such as national commissions) are entitled to 
undertake and the functions that they are supposed to perform. 
 
 NHRIs, according to Paris Principles, shall have the authority to provide 
advice to governmental bodies. They may submit, by a request of 
competent authority or upon their own initiative opinions, 
recommendations and reports on any matter concerning the promotion 
and protection of human rights. These matters include reviewing draft 
legislation and administrative actions; suggesting measures to improve 
the human rights situation or to stop certain violation, such as making 
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amendment to the existing legislation or initiating new drafts; preparing 
reports on the national situation with regard to human rights; and drawing 
the attention of the government to situations in any part of the country 
where human rights are being violated and thereby making proposals to 
put an end to such situations.139 In addition, NHRIs should have the 
mandate to promote and ensure the harmonization of national legislation 
and governmental practices with the international human rights 
instruments to which the state is a party; to encourage ratification of, or 
accession to, these instruments, and to ensure their implementation; to 
assist in formulating programs for teaching and research on human rights 
and to take part in their implementation in schools, universities, and 
professional circles; and to publicize human rights and combating all 
forms of discrimination.140 Finally, the Paris Principles contain special 
provisions on the mandate exercised by some NHRIs to receive 
complaints and investigate individual human rights violation. In this case, 
NHRIs may seek to settle a dispute by consultation or mediation between 
the individual and the governmental body; to inform the alleged victims 
of their rights; and of the hearing of their complaints, or alternatively to 
transmit them to other competent authority.141 
 
The provisions of the Sudanese National Human Rights Commission Act 
are largely similar to those of the Paris Principles. In fact, most of the 
sections are taken word by word from them and others with some 
cosmetic changes. For example the section that the Commission "should 
cooperate with national nongovernmental organizations devoted to 
promoting and protecting human rights, to economic and social 
development, combating racism and to protecting vulnerable groups", is 
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provided for in our Act in the section which relates to functions of the 
Commission, whereas, in Paris Principle it is mentioned as one of the 
methods of operation. Furthermore the principles mention the expression 
"all forms of discrimination" instead of "racism" which is mentioned in 
our Act. Therefore, the Paris Principles sections are much clearer than 
ours. However combating "all forms of discrimination is provided for in 
another place in the Act namely; in subsection 4(2) (m). 
 
The Paris Principles state or determine specific vulnerable groups to be 
protected such as children, migrant workers, refugees, and physically and 
mentally disabled persons. The Sudanese Act does not mention specific 
vulnerable groups to be protected. It states generally that the vulnerable 
groups should be protected by the National Commission. 
 
The Paris Principles, as many human rights commission Acts, determine 
expressly the method of dealing with the complaints. In this context the 
Sudanese Act does not contain any provision granting power to the 
commission to transmit a complaint to another competent authority. But 
since it is expected to be faced with some complex cases it can be 
understood that it has such power, because no case stays without 
receiving resolution. 
 
The National Human Rights Commission is empowered to deal with 
cases from all over the country. It will have one principle office in 
Khartoum and it is permitted to open branches in any state in Sudan. It 
would have been better and more practical if it had been clearly set out 
that it should establish branches or even separate state human rights 
commissions in any of the states. Such provision gives the commission a 
highly centralized system of operation. A centralized system of operation 
is not compatible with the trend towards governmental decentralization as 
well as with nature of human rights issues. There are local customs and 
history affecting human rights issues which are difficult to appreciate 
when viewed from a distance. The major fear is that a National Human 
Rights Commission with wrong perception of human rights will make 
protection of human rights ineffective throughout the country.  Thus we 
suggest that there should be state human rights commissions with the 
authority to provide appropriate and affective remedies to human rights 
violations. 
 
The Act relatively minimizes the seriousness of human rights violations 
by public officials. It lumps the violations committed by private persons 
together with those of the public officials. There are not special 
procedures that deal with cases involving the latter. A separate treatment 
of cases involving officials is necessary considering that they exercise 
power and lack a high degree of transparency in their operation. In other 
words, their human rights violations should be seen as serious cases 
requiring a different treatment 
. 
(b) National Commissions of Some Other Nations. 
 
 Uganda has established an independent constitutional body to promote 
and protect human rights called Uganda Human Rights Commission 
(UHRC).142 It was created upon the realization by the government that 
after independence Uganda suffered massive abuses of human rights, and 
many innocent Ugandans lost their lives, were harassed, detained without 
trail, tortured or discriminated against, displaced or forced into exile. The 
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Constituent Assembly of Uganda created a permanent Human Rights 
Commission taking into account the report of the Commission of Inquiry 
into Violations of Human Rights (1962-1986) and the recommendations 
of the Uganda Constitutional Commission. 
 
The Commission is composed of a chairperson and not less than other 
three persons appointed by the President of the Republic with the 
approval of Parliament. The chairperson and members of the Commission 
have to be persons of high moral character and proven integrity. These 
serve for a period of six years and are eligible for reappointment. 
 
The Commission is made up of five departments: Complaints and 
Investigations Department, responsible for receiving and processing 
complaints, conducting inspections, including prison visits, and carrying 
out timely and impartial investigation; the Legal and Tribunal 
Department, responsible for providing legal service for the Commission, 
and providing redress to victims of human rights violations through 
mediation and tribunal hearing; the Education, Research and Training 
Department, responsible for civic education with the goal of fostering and 
creating a culture of human rights and constitutionalism in Uganda; the 
Finance and Administrative Department, responsible for maintenance and 
administration of office premises, development of media strategy and 
establishment of regional offices; and the Monitoring Department, 
responsible for monitoring reports on human rights situation in Uganda 
and monitoring government compliance with international treaty 
obligation. 
 
The Commission's principal objective is to uphold, protect and promote 
human rights in Uganda. It has the following functions set down in the 
Constitution: to investigate, at its own initiative or on a compliant made 
by any person or a group of persons against violation of any human 
rights; to visit jails, prisons, and places of detention or related facilities 
with a view of assessing and inspecting conditions of the inmates and 
make recommendations; and to establish a continuing progamme of 
research, education and information to enhance respect of human rights. 
 
The UHRC has the power of a court: to summon any person to appear 
before it and produce any document or record relevant to any 
investigation by the Commission. If satisfied that there has been a 
violation of human rights or freedoms, the Commission may order the 
release of a detained person, or payment of compensation or any other 
legal remedy or redress. The UHRC is not however, a substitute for the 
courts; it is an additional organ available for citizens and it complements 
the work of the judiciary. The UHRC is bared from investigating any 
matter which is pending before a court or judicial tribunal, or a matter 
involving the relations or dealings between the government of Uganda 
and the government of any foreign state or international organization, or a 
matter relating to the exercise of the prerogative of mercy. 
 
All complaints about violations of human rights can be brought to the 
Commission except cases that are before a competent court of law. 
Complainant testimonies are received by the Complaints and 
Investigations Department, after which the respondent is contacted to 
give their side of the story. After they respond, the complainant is 
contacted for a response. If there are disparities in their stories, the 
Commission will carry out investigations to find out the truth. When the 
investigations are completed, the matter is referred to the Legal and 
Tribunal Department for further action. If Legal and Complaints 
Department is not satisfied with the findings, then the file will be referred 
back to complaints and investigations for better details. If they are 
satisfied with the facts presented then they will determine whether the 
case should be heard in a tribunal or whether it can be settled through 
mediation. In India the commission, while it inquires into complaints of 
violations of human rights, may call for information from the central 
government or any state government or other authority. Provided that the 
information is not received within the time stipulated by the commission, 
it may proceed to inquire into the complaint on its own. On the other 
hand, if, on receipt of information or report, the commission is satisfied 
either that no further inquiry is required or that the concerned authority 
has taken the required action, it may not proceed with the complaint.143 
 
Another example of other nation’s human rights commissions is the 
South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC).144 The SAHRC is a 
national institution which derives its powers from the constitution and the 
Human Rights Commission Act of 1994. The SAHRC works with 
government, civil society and individuals, both nationally and abroad, to 
fulfill its constitutional mandate and serves as both a watchdog and a 
visible route through which people can access their rights. While the 
handling and management of complaints concerning human rights 
violations lies at the heart of the SAHRC's work, it also aims to create a 
national culture of human rights through its advocacy, research and legal 
functions. It also implements, monitors and develops standards of human 
rights law. 
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While attempting to resolve most matters referred to it through 
negotiation, mediation and conciliation, the SAHRC has extensive 
powers in dealing with cases of human rights violations. These include 
search and seizure, the power to hold formal hearing and the power to 
litigate on behalf of complaints or in its own name. The SHARC has also 
established links with other independent institutions to which some 
matters are referred if these institutions are better placed to deal with 
them. 
 
The objectives of the SAHRC are similar to those of any other human 
rights commission. The SAHRC deals with complaints deemed to be in 
violation of a right included in the Bill of Rights. 
 
Generally speaking, national human rights commissions of other 
countries are similar in mandate and powers to ours. The differences 
between the commissions mentioned above and the Sudanese 
Commission are slight. The Ugandan National Human Rights 
Commission has the power of the court to for example, summon any 
person to attend before it and produce any document or record relevant to 
any investigation by the commission. Such power is not expressly 
provided for in our Act. The national commissions in many countries 
including the SAHRC have power to litigate on behalf of complaints or in 
its own name. It is not clear why our Commission has not been granted 
that power. 
 
(c) National Commissions and Internal Displacement. 
 
Internally displaced persons are one of the vulnerable groups that should 
be protected by national commissions. The Sudanese National Human 
Rights Commission Act provides, as most human rights commissions’ 
Acts, that the Commission should protect vulnerable groups. The location 
of national commissions within the state, their status as national 
institutions and their procedural flexibility suggests that they do have the 
potential to make a difference in the lives of internally displaced persons. 
Their comparative advantage lies in their location within government and 
the access this gives them to a wide range of actors who are either 
involved in the conflict or in providing relief and assistance to the 
displaced. It also comes from their ability to engage in a wide range of 
intervention strategies, both on their own and in combination with other 
actors. It comes from the support they can draw from other institutions 
worldwide and the regional networks of national institutions that are 
slowly beginning to emerge. The resources that human rights 
commissions are increasingly beginning to attract from donors give them 
another strong advantage. Their status as national institutions and the 
impact of their findings give them added strength. Their location within 
government gives them the opportunity to use both strategies of shame 
and strategies of negotiation to advance the rights of the displaced. Their 
status as a national institution enables them to critique government policy 
and to go public with their findings. Their public pronouncements are 
likely to have more of an impact than the pronouncements of NGOs. 
Public criticism can change policy and action as human rights groups 
well know, having frequently relied on the power of shame to change 
state behavior. Human rights commissions because of their status as 
national institutions also have the potential to negotiate and engage with 
both government and nongovernmental actors to ensure that the rights of 
the displaced are respected. With regard to internal displacement, there 
are a number of activities that human rights commissions are well 
positioned to do, for example, they can monitor access to the displaced 
and their ability to receive basic supplies such as food and medicine, visit 
camps and other places where the displaced are located to obtain accurate 
assessments of the conditions under which they live; conduct broader 
field surveys on a periodic basis, which would include gathering 
information on how the displaced populations are interacting with the 
local population, the state of basic service in those areas etc; assist policy-
makers in framing policy that takes into account the rights and needs of 
the displaced; and engage with the military to ensure that the civilian 
populations are spared the consequences of the conflict and military 
imperatives do not prevent assistance from reaching IDPs.145 
 
(ii) The Ombudspersons or Ombudsmen. 
 
(a)What is an ombudsman? 
 
 An ombudsman, or ombuds, is a dispute resolution practitioner who 
receives complaints, concerns, and questions from individuals; works to 
resolve these issues, making recommendations on individual matters 
where appropriate, and brings to entity's attention chronic or systemic 
problems and makes recommendations for improvement. A key feature 
distinguishing ombuds from other dispute resolution practitioners is the 
ombuds’ focus on systemic issues and on developing conflict prevention 
strategies.146 
 
There are two kinds of ombudsmen. Traditionally, ombudsman has been 
described as an individual who handles concerns and inquiries from the 
public-often referred to as an "external" ombudsman. For example, the 
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U.S.A. Environmental Protection Agency has ombudsmen who serve as 
points of contact for members of the public who have concerns about 
Superfund activities.147Over time organizations-governmental and 
nongovernmental alike- have also established ombudsmen to deal with 
workplace issues. Workplace ombudsmen provide an informal alternative 
to existing and more formal processes to deal with conflicts that arise in 
the workplace and other organizations climate issues. Because an ombuds 
does not have to follow formal processes, he or she can exercise 
flexibility to resolve issues. 
 
(b)The Core Principles for Ombudsmen. 
 
The core principles as determined by the Ombuds Association, American 
Bar Association (ABA) and other American organizations such as the 
U.S. Ombudsman Association and the University and College Ombuds 
Association are independence, neutrality and confidentiality. 
 
The Ombudsman Association Standards of Practice define independence 
as functioning independent of line management, with the ombudsman 
having a reporting relationship with the highest authority in an 
organization. According to ABA Ombudsman Committee's 
Recommended Standards for the Establishment and Operation of 
Ombudsman Offices, the ombudsman must be independent in its 
structure, function, and appearance and free from interference in the 
legitimate performance of duties to be credible and effective. According 
to the recommended standards, in assessing whether an ombudsman is 
independent, the following factors are important; whether anyone subject 
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to the ombudsman's jurisdiction or anyone directly responsible for a 
person under the ombudsman's jurisdiction can control or limit the 
ombudsman performance of duties, eliminate the office, remove the 
ombudsman other than for cause, or reduce the office's budget or 
resources. The recommended standards also state, among other things, 
that the ombudsman position should be explicitly defined and established 
as a matter of organization policy and that the ombudsman should also 
have access to all information within the organization, except as restricted 
by law.148 
 
The Ombudsman Association Standards of Practice define neutrality as 
not advocating for any one person in a dispute within an organization but 
advocating for fair processes and the fair administrative of those 
processes. The recommended standards of the ABA Ombudsman 
Committee state that the ombudsman does not represent complainants nor 
does the ombudsman defend the entity complained against. The 
ombudsman conducts inquiries and investigations in an impartial manner, 
seeking resolution for a fair outcome and making recommendations 
where appropriate. In addition, according to the recommended standards, 
the ombudsman should be an advocate for change when investigation or 
inquiry identifies a systemic problem. The University and College 
Ombuds Association standards add that an ombuds should have no 
interest or personal stake on issues handled. 
 
As to confidentiality, the Ombudsman Association standards define it as 
communications that are intended to be held in secret. The Ombudsman 
Association standards assert that there is a privilege regarding 
communications that allows individuals to come forward in a confidential 
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setting without the risk of reprisal. The recommended standards of ABA 
Ombudsman Committee state that confidentiality must extend to all 
communications with the ombudsman; including all notes and records 
maintained in the performance of the ombudsman duties. The 
Ombudsman's Association Standards also state that the ombudsman must 
not keep case records for the organization and that any written notes the 
ombudsman records in handling a case should be destroyed. The 
University and College Ombuds Association standards require that when 
seeking systemic change, an ombudsman should not reveal the identity of 
a singular situation that could be associated with a particular 
individual.149 
 
(c)Functions and powers of Ombuds. 
 
The primary function of this institution is to oversee fairness and legality 
in public administration. More specifically, the office of the ombudsman 
exists to protect the rights of individuals who believe themselves to be the 
victims of unjust acts on the part of the public administration. 
Accordingly, the ombudsman will often act as impartial mediator 
between an aggrieved individual and the government. The institution of 
ombudsman in all countries follows similar procedures in the 
performance of their duties. The ombudsman receives complaints from 
members of the public and will investigate these complaints provided 
they fall within the ombudsman's competence. In the process of 
investigation, the ombudsman is generally granted access to the 
documents of all relevant public authorities and may also be able to 
compel witnesses, including government officials, to provide information. 
He or she will then issue a statement or recommendation based on this 
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investigation. This statement is generally transmitted to the person 
lodging the complaints as well as to the office or authority complained 
against. In general, if the recommendation is not acted on, the 
ombudsman may submit a specific report to the legislature. This will be 
in addition to an annual report to the same body, which may include 
information on problems which have been identified and contain 
suggestions for legislative and administrative change. The complainant at 
first is required in many countries to exhaust alternative legal and 
administrative remedies. There may also be time-limits on the filing of 
complaint. Moreover, while the ombudsman's authority usually extends to 
all aspects of public administration, most ombudsmen are prevented from 
considering complaints involving members of the legislature or the 
judiciary. Access to the ombudsman also varies from country to country. 
In many countries, individuals may lodge a complaint directly with the 
ombudsman's office. In other countries complains may be submitted 
through an intermediary, such as a local member of parliament. 
Complaints made to the ombudsman are usually confidential and the 
identity of the complaint is not disclosed without that person's consent. 
The ombudsman is not always restricted to acting on complaints and may 
be able to begin an investigation on his or her own initiative. As with 
human rights commissions, self-initiative investigations by ombudsman 
offices often relate to the issues which the ombudsman may have 
determined to be of broad public concern, or issues which affect group 
rights and are therefore not likely to be the subject of an individual 
complaint.150 
 
In many respects, the powers of the ombudsman are quite similar to those 
of human rights commissions with competence to receive and investigate 
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complaints. Both are concerned with protecting rights of individuals and, 
in principle, neither has the power to make binding decisions. There are 
nevertheless some differences in the functions of the two bodies which 
reveal why some countries establish and simultaneously maintain both 
types of institutions. As explained above, the primary function of most 
ombudsmen is to ensure fairness and legality in public administration. In 
contrast commissions are more generally concerned with violations of 
human rights, particularly discrimination. In this respect, human rights 
commissions will often concern themselves with the actions of private 
bodies and individuals as well as the government. In general, the 
principle focus of activity for an ombudsman is individual complaints 
against public entities or officials. However, distinctions are becoming 
more and more blurred as ombudsman offices engage in a wide range of 
activities for the promotion and protection of human rights. Increasingly, 
offices of the ombudsman are assuming responsibilities in the area of 
promoting human rights, particularly through educational activities and 
the development of information programmes.151 
 
Sudan has an experience in the field of ombudsman. The Constitution of 
1998 establishes an institution which is exactly like any ombudsman in 
any country. This body is independent and is known as the" Public 
Grievances and Corrections Board". Its president and members are 
appointed by the President of the Republic with the approval of the 
National Assembly from persons of efficiency and propriety. The Board 
is responsible to the President of the Republic and the National 
Assembly. The Board, without prejudice to the jurisdiction of the 
judiciary, works at the federal level to clear away grievances, assure 
efficiency and purity in the practice of the state and in systems, or the 
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final executive or administrative acts, and also to extend justice after the 
final decisions of the institutions of justice. The Constitution also states 
that the Board shall work in coordination with the various organs of the 
state and submit its recommendations to the President of the Republic, the 
National Assembly or any public organ. This public organ according to 
our view may be The National Human Rights Commission which is, in 
many countries, supported internationally. The Constitution finally states 
that there shall be established public grievances and corrections board in 
the states by state law observing in accordance with the above mentioned 
provisions. In actuality there is an Act regulating the work of the Public 
Grievances and Corrections Board passed in 1998 the same year in which 
the Constitution was passed.152 
 
5- Differences between NHRIs and NGOs. 
 
In practice, some of the functions of NHRIs are similar to those of NGOs. 
For example, both organizations conduct human rights education 
activities, public awareness campaigns, and oversee government 
performance in relation to human rights. However, as state bodies, 
NHRIs are essentially different from NGOs. NHRIs are established by 
the state, according to special legislation (normally enacted by 
parliament) and have a wide officially-adopted mandate, especially in 
investigating governmental actions related to human rights. NGOs are 
part of the civil society and, as they are separated from state institutions 
and regulate their own program of work, ideally without state 
intervention, the state does not necessarily adopt their mandate. 
 
                                                 
152 . Art.130 of the Constitution of 1998 and Public Grievances and Corrections Board Act 1998. 
In their dealings with the UN, in particular, NHRIs and NGOs converge 
on some points and diverge on others. For NGOs, legal relations with the 
UN are clear generally, NGOs can participate within the UN Charter-
based human rights bodies through their consultative status at the 
ECOSOC. The rules of procedure of the various UN treaty-bodies permit 
NGOs to report to and participate in the meetings of the treaty-bodies. In 
contrast, the NHRIs' relationship with the UN's human rights system 
needs more clarification. Furthermore, NGOs can play an important role 
in encouraging governments to establish NHRIs, particularly if the state 
has not developed such an institution. NGOs have the capacity to work 
with both the government and NHRIs to increase the effectiveness of 
existing institutions. In addition, the composition of some NHRIs allows 
for the inclusion of representatives from human rights NGOs. Finally one 
of the emerging functions of NHRIs involves coordinating the work of 
local NGOs in reporting to the UN human rights treaty-bodies. 
 
6- Conclusions 
 
NHRIs were, generally, established in the past to realize specific human 
rights. The NHRCs were set up for the first time to combat all forms of 
discrimination. It was not one of their objectives, for example, to 
undertake any task with regard to the government obligations of 
international human rights instruments. The ombudsperson's original 
purpose was to oversee fairness and legality in public administration. The 
work and jurisdiction of these institutions, happily, have been 
increasingly wider and wider because of the continuous and increasing 
care the world grants to human rights. People are now more serious to see 
their rights implemented. 
 
The Public Grievances and Corrections Board is now playing an 
important role in protecting the rights, specially the rights of workers. 
The problem with this institution as with National Commission is that 
most of the citizens do not know any thing about it. They do not know 
that there are means other than their national courts through which they 
can seek rights protection and redress for violations, the National 
Commission is expected to spread this culture out. The National 
Commission and the Public Grievances and Corrections Board should 
cooperate and coordinate their work with other national human rights 
institutions.  
 
 NHRIs, in short, are expected to have more roles in facilitating the way 
the victims find remedies. They, as a recent study on national human 
rights institutions pointed out, provide an accessible, non-cost means of 
redress for the most vulnerable sections of society, who will have 
particular difficulty gaining access to conventional legal means of 
resolving their problems. 
 
Chapter Five 
Conclusions 
 
Throughout the history of mankind there has always been some 
awareness of rights. In general , people have been insisting that they have 
power to do some things or to be done for them and that no one can 
prevent them from doing that or from claiming their rights. This clear and 
simple concept of a right has been developing from time to time until the 
modern concept of fundamental rights and freedoms or human rights 
came into being. The concept of human rights is based on different 
theoretical bases adopted by three different schools which appeared in 
different historical periods in the legal and political development of the 
world. The first school is the school of positive law which emerged in the 
middle ages. Under the positive law theory, rights are a result of a 
contract or bargaining made by the rulers and the governed. The most 
important example is the English Great Charter (Magna Carta) agreed 
upon between King John and the barons in 1215. He committed himself 
as well as heirs for ever to grant the rights and liberties enumerated in the 
Magna Carta to all freemen of the kingdom and not to impose major taxes 
without permission of a "great council" representing the barons and to 
stop hiring mercenaries (Who had to be paid) if barons refused to fight . 
The Magna Carta led to many constitutional developments in the 
centuries that followed especially with regard to the history of human 
rights. But the rights that are enjoyed in accordance with the positive law 
view cannot genuinely be called human rights. The second school that 
tried to justify the rights was the school of natural law which had its 
origins in the classical Greek and early Christian thought and was 
eventually strengthened and elaborated as a set of ideas by the medieval 
Catholic theology. The natural law school concentrates on human 
flourishing which requires recognition of certain kinds of human goods. 
These human goods are desired as necessary everywhere for human being 
to flourish. This led to the thinking that there are common moral 
standards, which can be discerned by application of practical reason to 
human affairs. This reasoning, in turn, reveals that these moral standards 
can generate rights and duties which are not justified by reference to, or 
limited in application by, any particular legal system, community, state, 
race, creed or civilization. According to supporters and writers of natural 
law trend, any person has ability to discern the content of natural law. The 
rights which were set out in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and the Citizen were clearly attributed to natural law. The modern human 
rights are based on human dignity which is, according to this school, the 
only source of fundamental rights and freedoms. This new trend is now 
widely recognized and defended by all supporters and protectors of 
human rights. The rights according to this school are neither a result of a 
contract or bargaining between the rulers and the governed nor are they 
derived from natural law. But the natural law school and the modern 
school of human rights reach one consequence that human rights are not 
derived from the rulers or man-made authorities. They also agree that 
every individual has right to enjoy these rights irrespective of his religion, 
colour, social status, political creed or any other discriminatory bases. 
 
Human rights are internationally divided into three categories; political 
and civil rights (first generation rights), social, economic and cultural 
rights (second generation rights) and collective rights (third generation 
rights). These three generations reflect three different but connected 
stages in mankind's struggle against the enemies of humanity and 
freedom. The political and civil rights are a fruit of great revolutions 
staged by the governed in different European countries and in the United 
States of America. The rights that were laid down after the fall of 
dictatorship regimes were the basis of political and civil rights set out in 
1948 in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The 
economic, social, and cultural rights came into being after the industrial 
revolution and are now embodied in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR). The workers as 
individuals and groups find themselves in an urgent need for some rights 
in order to improve their economic and social situations. The rights that 
were recognized at that time have later become the basis of economic, 
social and cultural rights. However, these rights have been marginalized 
both at the international and national levels. 
 
Two suggestions can be offered in this research to be taken into account if 
economic, social and cultural rights are to be placed in a more central 
position in international human rights discourse and accordingly in the 
national discourse. We need to draft a new declaration or convention on 
specific provisions of the CESCR or the relevant provisions of the 
UDHR. We also suggest that the international institutions concerned 
specifically with economic and social rights, develop a list of targets for 
each economic, social or cultural right and begin talks with each state 
party to the CESCR to agree on a schedule of achievement for each right. 
The actual target for a particular right for a particular country should be 
different. The international community must provide assistance to the 
third world countries to achieve the actual targets. The third generation 
rights are now in throes of birth and they reflect another stage in our 
history in which groups and peoples need these rights. There is no 
jurisprudence developed by jurists on rights of this category. What the 
world needs today as far as these rights are concerned is adoption of an 
international convention on collective rights. I expect that after 10 to 20 
years we will find ourselves in an urgent need for rights which one cannot 
imagine now. 
 
The protection of human rights through national courts is not entirely 
new. The judiciary in any country is the protector of people's rights. The 
courts in Sudan have not dealt with many human rights cases because the 
culture of human rights is not spread among the citizens and lawyers. The 
human rights are viewed by many lawyers and citizens as a strange 
culture and cases that involve human rights are seen as of political nature. 
The international human rights provisions have not yet been incorporated  
completely and expressly into the domestic law of Sudan. But there are 
good judgments made by the High Court and the Supreme Court in some 
cases such as Joseph Garang V. The Supreme Commission  and Asma 
Mahmoud Mahamed Taha V. S.G. The courts in Sudan use the power of 
judicial review to invalidate any legislation which is inconsistent with the 
constitution. Although the judicial review has been criticized as against 
democracy, there are various ways of sliding over this indictable reality.  
In the United States, Marshal C.J did so when he spoke of enforcing, on 
behalf of the people of the United States, the limits that they have 
ordained for the institutions of a limited government. The judicial review 
does not constitute control by an unrepresentative minority of an elected 
majority because the people is superior to both; and where the will of the 
legislature, declared in it is statutes, stands in opposition to that of the 
people declared in the constitution of the country, the judges ought to be 
governed by the latter rather that the former. The judicial review of 
legislation is followed in countries with written constitutions, such as 
U.S.A, whereas in the United Kingdom which has no written constitution 
the ordinary laws are used to protect human rights. In addition to that 
courts can benefit from international human rights by depending on them 
in cases of interpreting and determining the content and extent of rights 
guaranteed by the constitution or domestic laws. 
 
Whatever method or theory is used or adopted, courts have certain 
capacities for dealing with matters of human rights. Judges have or 
should have the leisure, the training, the insulation, the independency and 
neutrality that enable them to protect human rights. Judges in Sudan must 
shamelessly benefit from the experiences of other states, and in particular 
the experience of the United States of America, to effectively protect the 
human rights, and fundamental freedoms of the people. 
 
The National Human Rights Institutions are the modern method of human 
rights protection. They are not established in any country to replace the 
other organizations such as NGOs and national courts, but to cooperate 
with them. The work of the United Nation in the field of human rights has 
included a focus on the subject of national institution for the protection 
and promotion of human rights. The national human rights institution 
plays a significant role at the national level in promoting and protecting 
human rights and fundamental freedoms and in developing and enhancing 
public awareness and observance of those rights and freedoms. 
 
The passing of the National Human Rights Act in Sudan is a consequence 
of an international wave concerning human rights promotion and 
protection. I hope that the Commission which is established by the Act 
would go further to make human rights idea a part of our creed and 
deepen - by its work - the belief of the citizens in its role in protecting 
human rights. In order to implement or carry out this anticipated task and 
role completely, we need to put the NHRIs at a highest possible level. 
 Many countries in the world have established human rights commissions 
with broad mandate and strong and wide powers but still there are serious 
and gross human rights violations in their countries. In my view, these 
countries establish human rights commission only to pride in 
international conferences and meetings that they are doing their best to 
protect human rights. In order to avoid this we need to give our 
Commission much more powers, especially the power to litigate on 
behalf of the victims either at their request or at the commission's own 
initiative. We also need to strengthen the ties of the Commission with 
international human rights institutions. The newly born institution need to 
acquire the trust and confidence of the international community if it wants 
to win the international financial support and recognition. The 
commissioners should, finally, be really independent, non-politicians and 
not members of political parties. They must be persons who have no 
ideology but the ideology of human rights. 
 
I want to conclude that the promotion and protection of human rights in 
Sudan require, in particular, the following: 
 
First; the international human rights law should be expressly incorporated 
into our domestic law by providing directly in the constitution that the 
human rights treaties are part of our law or by passing a Human Rights 
Act by the parliament as it was done in the United Kingdom in 1998. 
Such an act would enable lawyers, in particular judges and advocates, to 
be more active in the field of human rights protection. Secondly, the 
judiciary must prepare periodic courses to raise the awareness of the 
judges on human rights. Thirdly; the NHRIs must coordinate and 
cooperate with international organizations which are ready at any time to 
help national institutions in promoting and protecting human rights. To 
carry out this and other duties effectively our country should establish 
independent and separate state human right commissions. Each 
commission must be empowered with strong and broad mandate for the 
purposes of protecting human rights at the state level. The establishment 
of state human rights commissions is consistent with the trend towards 
government decentralization as well as with the nature of human rights 
issues. In addition, the cooperation that must exist between the national 
and state commissions will have a positive effect in helping the national 
commission and the government to make new and more active politics for 
the benefit of human rights protection. 
 
In short, national courts and national human rights institutions have 
ability to spread, deepen and protect human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. The effectiveness of human rights promotion and protection 
depends, largely, upon the assistance and support that the international 
and national authorities as well as civil society organizations grant to 
national courts and national human rights institutions. 
 
 
 
